The Richards Irrigation Co. v. Ves A. Karren, Rock Producs Co., Integon Indemnity Corporation : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
The Richards Irrigation Co. v. Ves A. Karren, Rock
Producs Co., Integon Indemnity Corporation :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Douglas Credille; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for Appellant.
David L. Barclay; Nathan R. Hyde; Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson; Attorneys for Appellees.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, The Richards Irrigation Co. v. Ves A. Karren, Rock Producs Co., Integon Indemnity Corporation, No. 920407 (Utah
Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3363
UTAf-
r<4 f"1 ^ ; •' 
KFU 
50 
.A'i* 
D U w K T NO, 
BRIEF 
il2M£l 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS CO., 
and INTEGON INDEMNITY CORPORATION, a 
foreign corporation, 
Defendants. 
VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS 
COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., a Utah 
corporation also known as RICHARDS 
IRRIGATION CO., DIVISION OF WATER 
RESOURCES FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, a 
division or agency of the State of 
Utah, PETER T. LIN, W. JAMES PALMER, 
Third-Party 
Defendants and 
Appellees. 
Court of Appeals No. 920407-CA 
Priority No. „%& 1$ 
Third District Court Case 
No. C-87-2390 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM A 1 2 ( B ) ( 6 ) DISMISSAL OF A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
BY THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE JUDGE YOUNG 
R. DOUGLAS CREDILLE 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
1 6 3 6 West N. Temple # 3 0 0 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 6 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 3 - 4 4 4 6 
A t t o r n e y s f o r A p p e l l a n t 
DAVID L. BARCLAY 
NATHAN R. HYDE 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON i? 
50 S. Main Street, Ste. 700 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Attorneys for Appellees 
IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION C O . , a U t a h 
c o r p o r a t i o n , 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS CO., 
and INTEGON INDEMNITY CORPORATION, a 
foreign corporation, 
Defendants. 
VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS 
COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., a Utah 
corporation also known as RICHARDS 
IRRIGATION CO., DIVISION OF WATER 
RESOURCES FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, a 
division or agency of the State of 
Utah, PETER T. LIN, W. JAMES PALMER, 
Third-Party 
Defendants and 
Appellees. 
Court of Appeals No. 920407-CA 
Priority No. )& It) 
Third D i s t r i c t Court Case 
No. C-87-2390 
APPELLANTS BRIEF 
APPEAL PROM A 1 2 ( B ) ( 6 ) DISMISSAL OP A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
BY THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE JUDGE YOUNG 
R. DOUGLAS CREDILLE 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
1 6 3 6 West N. Temple # 3 0 0 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 6 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 3 - 4 4 4 6 
A t t o r n e y s f o r A p p e l l a n t 
DAVID L. BARCLAY 
NATHAN R. HYDE 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
50 S. Main Street, Ste. 700 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Attorneys for Appellees 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
>**!as 
J — t - - : ^ r - p - . . . . . . ;?: 
ISSLES PREJ~*. . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A 
STANDARD - E^Ylfc' . . 3 
[r «y . TTOhAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 6 
STATEMENT ur . n: - . . . . . . . . . . . . . > 
RELEVANT F^  "*! ^  . , 3 
t- ^ • «* ' . . . A 2 
PC'IN'; 14 
I :AH : iOVERNMENTA: .^"MTX ACT DOES NOT BAR ANY OF ROCK 
I-ROD' * ' * ^ LAIMS AGALNVr THE STATE DEFENDANTS , 14 
A. The 198 : Amendments to the 'Governmental Immunity 
Act Ha, N* Application to this Case. . 14 
B. Appx^'C";; : - th's Pre-198 7 Governmental 
Immunity Act to the Case at Bar 
C. A c t i v 111 e s o f t h e I. J i v i s i o n * s P e r s o i "i n e .1 I) o N o t 
Constitute a Governmental Function " 
D. Even it the Activities of the State Defendants 
Constituted a Governmental Function, Immunity 
Under the Act is Waived, , , , 
1. Activities of the State Defendants are 
mi nisterial and not discretionary . . . . 
2. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act Expressly 
Waives Sovereign Immunity With Respect to Rock 
Products' Contract Cause of Action. . . . . . 
A PLEADER _5 REQUIRED ONLY TO MAK: A S[ • : 
STATEMENT * -~ > : . . . . . . 
POINT III 
ROCK PRODUCTS' COMPLAINT STATES AN ACTIONABLE CLAIM FOR 
BREACH OF THE CONTRACTUAL DUTY OWED ROCK PRODUCTS . . . 28 
POINT IV 31 
ROCK PRODUCTS' COMPLAINT STATES ACTIONABLE CLAIMS 
FOR BREACH OF DUTY OF GOOD FAITH, FRAUD, AND 
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 31 
POINT V 
ROCK PRODUCTS' COMPLAINT STATES ACTIONABLE CLAIMS 
FOR TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE WITH ROCK PRODUCTS' 
PROSPECTIVE AND PRESENT ECONOMIC RELATIONS 36 
POINT VI 
ROCK PRODUCTS STATES AN ACTIONABLE CLAIM FOR 
CIVIL REMEDY DUE TO THE STATE DEFENDANTS' 
VIOLATION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 40 
POINT VII 
ROCK PRODUCTS STATES AN ACTIONABLE CLAIM AGAINST LIN 
AND PALMER FOR VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 44 
CONCLUSION 47 
49 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Cases 
Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, Okla., 
896 F.2d 1228 (10th Cir. 1990) 45 
Andrus v. State, 
541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975) 16 
Andrus v. State, 
541 P.2d 117 (Utah 1975) 21 
Atkin, Wright & Mills v. Mountain State Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985) 36 
Batista v. Rodriguez, 
702 F.2d 393 (1st Cir., 1983) 44 
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 
701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985) 31, 32, 35 
Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 
111 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989) 38 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 
43 U.S. 388, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971) . . . 42 
Blackham v. Snelgrove, 
3 Utah 2d 157, 280 P.2d 453 (Utah 1955) 27 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 
487 U.S. 186, 92 L. Ed. 2d 140, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) . . 5 
Bowles v. State ex rel. Dept. of Trans., 
652 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1982) 38 
Bradt v. Smith, 
634 F.2d 796 (5th Cir., 1981) 44 
Branum v. Clark, 
927 F.2d 698 (2nd. Cir. 1991) 4 
Bunnell v. Bills, 
13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P. 2d 597 (Utah 1962) 39 
Burr v. Child, 
265 P.2d 383 (Utah 1953) 26 
Christensen v. Automatic Transmission Serv., 
Inc., 467 P.2d 605 (Utah 1970) 28 
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. 
Co., 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983) 35 
Computer Sciences Corp. v. Ibarra, 
685 F. Supp. 748 (D. Colo. 1988) 45 
Condor v. A.L. Williams & Assoc, 
739 P.2d 634-637 (Utah App. 1987) 33, 34 
Conley v. Gibson, 
355 U.S. 41 (1982) 44 
Culp Constr. Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d 650 
(Utah 1990), citing, Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 
423 P.2d 659 (Utah 1967) 34 
Dalton v. Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary Dist., 
676 P.2d 399 (Utah 1984) 16, 17, 18, 19, 24 
Davis v. Passman, 
442 U.S. 228, 60 L. Ed.2d 846, 99 S. Ct. 2264 (1979). . . . 42 
Doe v. Arguelles, 
716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985) 16, 21, 23 
Electrical Constr. & Maint. Co., Inc. v. Maeda 
Pac. Corp., 764 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1985) 5, 44 
Ellis v. Social Serv. Dept.f Etc., 
615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980) 28 
First Security Bank v. Wright, 
521 P.2d 563 (Utah 1974) 39 
Frank v. State, 
613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980) 22 
Gammon v. Federated Milk Producers, 
14 U.2d 291, 383 P.2d 402 (Utah 1963) 36 
Gill v. Timm, 
720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986) 27 
Hafer v. Melo, 
502 U.S. , 116 L. Ed. 2d 301, 112 S. Ct. (1991) . . . .46 
ii 
Hamill v. Maryland Cas. Co., 
209 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1954) 29, 30 
Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 
794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990) 24 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed.2d 396 
(1982) 46, 47 
Heiner v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 
790 P. 2d 107 (Utah App. 1990) 4 
Hickman v. Taylor, 
329 U.S. 495, 67 Supreme Ct. 385, 91 Lawyers Ed. 2d 451 . . 26 
Irvine v. Salt Lake County, 
785 P.2d 411 (Utah 1989) 15 
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 
377 U.S. 426, 84 S. Ct. 1555 (1964) 42 
Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 
657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) 36 
Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Servs. , 
667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983) 21 
Local No. 57 v. Bechtel Power Corp., 
834 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1987) cert, denied, 
486 U.S. 1055, 108 S.Ct. 2822, 100 L.Ed.2d 923 (1988) . . . 41 
Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 
626 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981) 29 
Myers v. McDonald, 
635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981) 14 
Olsen v. Park-Craig-Olsen, Inc., 
815 P.2d 1356 (Ut. App. 1991) 4 
Pace v. Parrish, 
247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952) 33 
Pape v. Knoll, 
687 P.2d 1087 review denied, 690 P.2d 506 
(Ore. App. 1984) 34 
iii 
Pitman v. Larsen Distrib. Co., 
724 P.2d 1379 (Colo, App. 1986) 34 
Porter v. Shoemaker, D.C., 
6 F.R.D. 438, 10 Fed. Service 26 
Resource Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock 
Co., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985) 32 
Richardson v. Flemming, 
651 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. , 1981) 44 
Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 784 P. 2d 459 (Utah 1989) 15, 17 
S.E.C. v. National Sees., Inc., 
393 U.S. 453, 89 S. Ct. 564 (1969) 42 
Schmitt v. Billings, 
600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979) 22 
Schwinghammer v. Alexander, 
446 P.2d 414 29 
Soter v. Wasatch Dev. Corp., 
443 P.2d 663 (Utah 1968) 39 
St. Benedict's Dev. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 
8112 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991) 4 
St. Benedict's Dev. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 
811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991) 4, 31 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp. , 
605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), and in Johnson v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 432 (Utah 1981) 16, 17 
State v. Packard, 
250 P.2d 561 (Utah 1952) 41 
Thomas v. Clearfield City, 
642 P. 2d 737 (Utah 1982) 17, 19 
Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v. Dickamore, 
652 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1982) 29 
Varady v. White, 
595 P.2d 272 (Colo. App. 1979) 34 
iv 
Wasatch Bank of Pleasant Grove v. Surety Ins. 
Co. of Cal., 
307 P.2d 298 (Utah 1985) 28 
Weigand v. Union Nat. Bank of Wichita, 
610 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1980) 33 
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 
656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982) 27 
Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 
762 P.2d 1090 (1988) 38 
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes & Rules 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV 45 
Constitution of Utah, Article XII, § 19 (1896) 3, 6, 40 
42 United States Code 1983 2 , 3 , 6 , 8, 25, 44 
Utah Code Annotated § 34-24-2 (1969) 3, 43 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-3 0-3 6 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-4(4) (1983) 6, 22 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-5 (1985) 6, 18 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-10 (1985) 6, 18 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-11(1) (1983) . . . .6, 14, 15, 20, 23 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-19 (1965) 10 
Utah Code Annotated § 68-3-3 (1953) 6 
Utah Code Annotated § 68-3-4 (1953) 6, 43 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-107(3) (1973) 43 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-(2)(k) (1986 as amended) 2 
Rule 8(a), (e) , (f) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 26 
Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure passim 
v 
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c o r p o r a t i o n , 
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v s . 
VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS CO., 
and INTEGON INDEMNITY CORPORATION, a 
foreign corporation, 
Defendants. 
VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS 
COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., a Utah 
corporation also known as RICHARDS 
IRRIGATION CO., DIVISION OF WATER 
RESOURCES FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, a 
division or agency of the State of 
Utah, PETER T. LIN, W. JAMES PALMER, 
Third-Party 
Defendants and 
Appellees. 
Court of Appeals No. 920407-CA 
Priority No. 16 
Third D i s t r i c t Court Case 
No. C-87-2390 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM A 1 2 ( B ) ( 6 ) DISMISSAL OF A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
BY THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE JUDGE YOUNG 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-(2)(k) (1986 as amended). 
ISSUE8 PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the 
"Act") bars any of Rock Products' causes of action against the 
State Defendants (the Division of Water Resources for the State 
of Utah, Peter T. Lin and W. James Palmer): 
a. Whether the 1987 amendments to the Act apply 
to this case; 
b. Whether the conduct of the State Defendants 
constitutes the performance of a "governmental 
function"; 
c. Whether immunity from suit is waived because 
the conduct of Peter T. Lin ("Lin") and W. James Palmer 
("Palmer") did not arise out of the performance of a 
discretionary function; 
d. Whether immunity from suit is waived for Rock 
Products' breach of contract cause of action; 
e. Whether Lin and/or Palmer may be held 
personally liable for causes of action based upon fraud 
or malice; 
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f. Whether Lin and Palmer are subject to suit 
under Rock Products' federal civil rights cause of 
action; 
2. Whether Rock Products has sufficiently pled causes 
of action against the respective State Defendants for: 
a. Fraud; 
b. Negligent Misrepresentations; 
c. Conspiracy; 
d. Breach of Contract; 
e. Failure to Fund; 
f. Interference with Prospective Economic 
Relations; 
g. Interference with Present Economic Relations; 
h. Injunctive Relief; 
i. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing; 
j. Blacklisting; and 
k. a Civil Rights Violation under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. 
8TANDARD OF REVIEW 
Several standards of review are pertinent to Rock 
Products' appeal: 
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1. The Utah Court of Appeals (1) must accept all of 
the factual allegations of the Complaint as true and consider 
them, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in a 
light most favorable to Rock Products and (2) must reverse the 
order of the District Court and deny the Motion to Dismiss unless 
it appears to a certainty that Rock Products would not be 
entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved 
in support of its claims. St. Benedict's Dev. v. St. Benedict's 
Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991); Anderson v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 200 Ut. Adv. Rep. (Ut. App. 1992); Heiner v. S. 
J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107 (Utah App. 1990). 
2. The Standard of Review for claims dismissed under 
Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is that the Utah 
Court of Appeals gives the trial court's ruling no deference and 
reviews under a correctness standard. St. Benedict's Dev. v. St. 
Benedict's Hospital, 8112 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991); Olsen v. Park' 
Craig-Olsen, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356 (Ut. App. 1991). 
3. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is generally not final 
or with prejudice on the merits; a plaintiff should be given the 
opportunity to file an amended complaint to correct any technical 
defects in the pleading. Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-6 
(2nd. Cir. 1991). See 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 1357 at 360-65 (1990). 
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4. The Court should examine the Third-Party Complaint 
to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any 
possible theory. Bowers v. Hardwick, 487 U.S. 186, 202, 92 
L. Ed. 2d 140, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2849 (1986). 
5. The Utah Court of Appeals should be reluctant to 
dismiss under 12(b)(6) when an asserted theory is a novel theory. 
Electrical Constr. & Maint. Co., Inc. v. Maeda Pac. Corp., 764 
F.2d 619, 623 (9th Cir. 1985). 
[INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK] 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The constitutional and statutory provisions governing 
this appeal are the following: 
1. The United States Constitution, Fourteenth 
Amendment (attached hereto as part of Addendum "C"); 
2. The Utah Constitution, Article XII, § 19 (attached 
as Addendum "D"); 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (attached as Addendum "E"); 
4. Several sections of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, U.C.A. §§ 63-30-3, 4(4), 5, 10, and 11(1) (attached as 
Addendum "F"); 
5. U.C.A. §§ 68-3-3 and 4 (attached as Addendum "G") ; 
6. U.C.A. §§ 34-24-1 and 2 (attached as Addendum 
"H") . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
This cases arises out of the installation by Ves A. 
Karren dba Rock Products ("Rock Products") of a pressurized water 
irrigation system currently utilized for The Richards Irrigation 
Company ("Richards") in Salt Lake County. Under its written 
contract with Richards ("State Contract") the Division of Water 
Resources for the State of Utah (the "Division") undertook 
responsibility (i) to finance 85% of the costs of the system, 
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(ii), to design and layout the system and provide other 
engineering services, (iii) to prepare specifications, plans, and 
bidding documents for contractors, and (iv) to supervise 
construction of the system. Rock Products asserts that it was an 
intended third-party beneficiary under the State Contract, that 
it was acting as the agent of Richards, and that duties arose to 
it because of such undertakings. 
Rock Products was not fully paid for the installation 
of the system and seeks additional funds from the Division as a 
result. The Third-Party Complaint also asserts claims against 
the Division and Lin, an employee of the Division, for inducing 
Rock Products to install materials for which Lin and the Division 
had no intention of paying and for negligently representing said 
conditions. Another employee of the Division, Palmer, is also 
sued for "blacklisting" Rock Products from bidding upon or 
participating in Utah State Contracts in order to coerce Rock 
Products into settling cost amounts with Richards for which the 
Division would ultimately be partially liable under the State 
Contract. 
Course of Proceedings. 
Rock Products filed an Amended Third-Party Complaint 
("Complaint"), asserting the following Causes of Action against 
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the Division, Lin and Palmer (collectively, the "State 
Defendants11) : 
1. Against the Division for breach of contract for 
failure to properly investigate and to represent to Rock Products 
the soil conditions of the system. (Fifth Cause of Action) 
2. Against the Division for failure to fully meet its 
funding obligations for the system. (Sixth Cause of Action) 
3. Against Lin for negligent misrepresentation of soil 
conditions. ^Third Cause of Action) 
4. Against Palmer and the Division for tortious 
interference with existing and prospective economic relations. 
(Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Causes of Action) 
5. For injunctive relief against the Division and 
Palmer. (Eleventh Cause of Action) 
6. Against the Division for breach of good faith duty. 
(Twelfth Cause of Action). 
7. Against the Division and Palmer for violation of 
State constitutional rights guaranteed under Article 12, Section 
19 of the Utah Constitution. (Thirteenth Cause of Action) 
8. Against Lin and Palmer for violation of 
constitutionally protected rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
("§ 1983"). (Fifteenth Cause of Action). 
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The State Defendants brought a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss all causes of action against them. No affidavits or 
evidence was presented. 
Disposition by the Trial Court. 
The Court, without taking evidence of any kind, 
dismissed with prejudice all of the foregoing Causes of Action on 
the following grounds: 
1. The Complaint "fails to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted against the State Defendants." 
2. The Act "bars every aspect" of Rock Products7 
Complaint against the State Defendants. 
3. "Rock Products has no contract with the State and 
is not the intended beneficiary of the State Contract". 
4. "Rock Products' tort claims do not state a cause 
of action, and are also barred by immunity." 
5. "Rock Products' constitutional and statutory and 
civil rights claims failed because of sovereign immunity; and 
because Rock Products has failed to state a claim; and because, 
upon the alleged facts, Rock Products cannot state a claim under 
the State or Federal statutes or The Utah Constitution or The 
United States Constitution." 
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6. "As to the Fifteenth Cause of Action, (§ 1983 
Claim), Rock Products has failed to comply with the notice 
requirements of § 63-30-11 and 12." 
The Court also stated that Rock Products had failed to 
comply with the undertaking requirements of § 63-30-19, but from 
the statements by the Court at the hearing and from, the language 
of the Order, itself, the Court did not base its ruling on this 
issue. The Court specifically states that the Complaint "is 
dismissed with prejudice, for the reasons set forth m paragraphs 
1-6." 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Inasmuch as the Court dismissed the allegations against 
the State Defendants with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) without 
taking any evidence by affidavit or otherwise, the pertinent 
document before the Court is the Complaint. (The Complaint is 
attached as Addendum "A"; R. 485-525.J1 Rather than restate all 
of the allegations of the, Rock Products hereby summaries and 
highlights the following aspects of those allegations: 
1. The Division agreed with Richards, among other 
things, (i) to finance 85% of the costs of the system, (ii), to 
design and layout the system and to provide other engineering 
±,fR. 485-525" refers the Court to pages 485-525 of the Record 
on Appeal. 
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services, (iii) to prepare specifications, plans, and bidding 
documents for contractors, and (iv) to supervise construction of 
the system. (Complaint, f 11; R. 491-492,) 
2. In so acting, the Division became and acted in the 
capacity of the agent and duly authorized representative of 
Richards, and Rock Products was an intended third-party 
beneficiary under the Division Contract. (Complaint, JJ 11, 18, 
& 58; R. 492, 494-95, 507.) 
3. The Division in fact undertook to perform the 
activities described above prepared, although that performance 
was incomplete and often flawed. (Complaint, f5 14, 19, 20, 21, 
25, 27, 32, 33, 35, 45, 55, 58, and 59; R. 493 495-96, 496, 
498-500, 503, 505-508.) 
4. The Division breached its obligations to Rock 
Products by failing to properly carry out its obligations 
regarding investigation, layout, supervision of construction, and 
representations under the Contract, (Complaint, ff 58 and 59; R. 
507-508) and failed to pay all of the funds to which Rock 
Products was entitled from the Division. (Complaint, 5 62; 
R. 509.) 
5. Lin, in conjunction with Widerberg and as the 
Division engineer on site, entered into a scheme to defraud Rock 
Products by inducing Rock Products to install sand and then not 
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pay for the same. (Complaint, ff 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, and 37; R. 
500-502.) Lin also misrepresented soil conditions of the 
properties at the pre-bid conference giving rise to causes of 
action for negligent misrepresentation. (Complaint, JJ 45-50, 
R. 503-505.) 
6. Palmer and the Division interfered with present 
and prospective economic relations by refusing to permit Rock 
Products to participate in and bid upon State contracts and 
removing it from the "pre-qualified potential contractor list" as 
a means of coercing Rock Products to settle its differences with 
Richards. (Complaint, ffl 64-68, 70-75, 77-84, and 86; R. 509-512, 
513-515.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rock Products hereby presents the following Summary of 
Argument: 
1. The Court erred in concluding that the Act bars 
every aspect of Rock Products' Complaint against the State 
Defendants for the following reasons: 
a. The Act does not apply to the allegations and 
conduct of the State Defendants in this case because the 
State Defendants were not involved in a governmental 
function; 
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b. Even if they were involved in a governmental 
function, the State Defendants were performing "ministerial" 
rather than "discretionary" functions; 
c. The Act does not bar contract claims; and 
d. The Act does not bar Constitutional or § 198 3 
claims. 
2. The Court erred in determining that the Complaint 
did not state a claim upon which relief may be granted against 
the State Defendants because the necessary elements for breach of 
contract, fraud, § 1983, and Constitutional claims were properly 
plead under the "notice pleading" standards of this jurisdiction. 
The Court of Appeals should be reluctant to dismiss under 
12(b)(6) when a novel theory is asserted as with the Utah 
Constitutional claims. Even were this not the case, dismissal of 
the case "with prejudice" was improper, and, at the least, Rock 
Products should be given the opportunity to correct any technical 
deficiencies if they exist. 
3. The Court erred in concluding that Rock Products 
must comply with the Act's notice requirements as a pre-requisite 
to bringing an action under § 1983. 
4. The Court erred in ruling, without taking any 
evidence, that Rock Products was not an intended third-party 
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beneficiary of the State Contract and had no other contractual 
duties to Rock Products. 
5. The Court erred in stating that Rock Products could 
"not plead" any constitutional or § 1983 cause of action. 
POINT I 
UTAH'S GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DOES NOT BAR ANY OF ROCK 
PRODUCT'S CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE DEFENDANTS 
A. The 1987 Amendments to the Governmental Immunity 
Act Have No Application to this Case. 
The State Defendants alleged in their Motion to Dismiss 
that they are immune in this case from suit based, in part, on 
the amendments to the Act enacted by the 1987 General Session of 
the Legislature. (R. 829-831.) Those amendments (the 
"Amendments") became effective April 27, 1987 and broadened the 
definition for what constitutes a "governmental function"; the 
Amendments contain no statement that they are to be retroactive. 
Because the 1987 amendments have no application to this case, the 
immunity arguments of the State Defendants are without merit. 
According to the Act, "[a] claim arises when the 
statute of limitations that would apply if the claim were against 
a private person begins to run." U.C.A. § 63-30-11(1). Utah law 
is that a cause of action generally accrues when "the last event 
necessary to complete the cause of action" happens. Myers v. 
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). The Utah Supreme Court 
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has applied the same rule in cases where the claims are against 
governmental entities. See e.g., Warren v. Provo City Corp., 196 
Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah 1992). Since all of the acts 
complained of in this case occurred prior to 1987, Rock Products' 
claims all arose prior to the April 1987 effective date of the 
1987 Amendments. 
The Utah Supreme Court has generally declined to 
retroactively apply amendments to the Act. In refusing to apply 
1984 amendments to the Act, the Utah Supreme Court followed the 
statutory mandate that lf [n]o part of these revised statutes is 
retroactive, unless expressly so declared." Rocky Mt. Thrift 
Stores v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah 1989), 
citing U.C.A. § 68-3-3 (1953). As applied to the Act, that court 
further explained, "If the 1984 amendment provides defendant with 
any greater degree of immunity . . . than that previously 
provided . . . it is a substantive change from the law . . . and 
cannot be applied retroactively." Id. at 462 (emphasis in 
original); Accord, Irvine v. Salt Lake County, 785 P.2d 411, 
412-13 (Utah 1989). 
The Rocky Mt. Thrift and Irvine decisions are 
dispositive of the retroactivity question here. Even the State 
Defendants admit that the Amendments to the Act broaden the scope 
of governmental immunity by clarifying and broadening the meaning 
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of "governmental function.11 (R. 830.) Accordingly, the 1987 
amendments have altered the substantive law in effect when the 
parties engaged in the relevant activities. To now apply the 
Amendments retroactively would deprive Rock Products of causes of 
action that clearly existed at the time Rock Products performed 
work on the system. Therefore, the Amendments clearly do not 
apply to this case. 
B. Application of Utah's Pre-1987 Governmental 
Immunity Act to the Case at Bar. 
Utah law relevant to determining whether governmental 
immunity exists in this case derives from the pre-1987 Act as it 
has been interrupted by the Utah Supreme Court in Standiford v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), and in Johnson 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 432 (Utah 1981) (defining 
"governmental function"); Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 
1975) (discussing distinction between ministerial and 
discretionary actions); Dalton v. Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary 
Dist., 676 P.2d 399 (Utah 1984) (holding the Act does not apply 
to nongovernmental functions); Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 
(Utah 1985) (discretionary vs. ministerial); and other cases. 
The Act affords governmental immunity for any injury 
which results from the exercise of a governmental function, 
subject to various express statutory waivers. Because the pre-
1987 Act did not define "governmental function," the Utah Supreme 
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Court supplied such a definition. In Standiford v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 605 P. 2d 1230 (Utah 1980), the Supreme Court stated 
that, in order for the activities of a governmental entity to 
comprise a "governmental function," such activity must be "of 
such unique nature that it can only be performed by governmental 
agency or . . . is essential to the core of governmental 
activity." Id. at 1236-1237. Commenting on the addition of the 
Johnson case analysis to the Standiford test, the Utah Supreme 
Court noted that the test lf/does not refer to what government may 
do, but to what government alone must do7 and includes 
'activities not unique in themselves . . . but essential to the 
performance of those activities that are uniquely governmental'." 
Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459, 
462 (Utah 1989) quoting Johnson at 434 (emphasis in original). 
Applying the Standi ford/Johnson test, the Utah Supreme 
Court has held many activities carried out by governmental 
entities to not be afforded immunity under the Act. See, e.g. 
Dalton, supra, (the operation of a sewer system is not a 
governmental function), and Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642 P.2d 
737 (Utah 1982) (the collection and disposal of sewage are not 
governmental functions). 
The Act, as applied in this case, operates as follows: 
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(1) The Act does not afford immunity for any action 
undertaken by a governmental entity which is not a 
"governmental function" under the Standiford/Johnson 
test; 
(2) When immunity is not afforded as set forth above, 
no provision of the Act applies, Dalton, supra., at 
400; 
(3) The Act specifically provides (and still does, 
even after the Amendments) for waiver of governmental 
immunity in certain situations. See, e.g., § 63-30-5, 
§ 63-30-10. 
The right to maintain an action, then, against a governmental 
entity could result from a finding that the alleged injury either 
did not result from the exercise of a governmental function, or, 
even though the injury resulted from the exercise of a 
governmental function, the government's immunity had been 
expressly waived. However, Rock Products asserts that there is 
no need for this Court to decide more than that the State 
Defendants' acts and decisions do not amount to governmental 
functions. 
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C. Activities of the Division's Personnel Do Not 
Constitute a Governmental Function. 
The alleged activities of the State Defendants do not 
meet the Standi ford/Johnson "governmental functions" test, A 
brief review of a series of Utah Supreme Court cases readily 
demonstrates this. 
In Dalton v. Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary Dist., 676 
P.2d 399 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
operation of a sewer system by a sanitary district was not a 
governmental function since the operation of the sewer system was 
deemed not to be so unique that it could only be performed by a 
governmental agency or was essential to the core of governmental 
activity. Dalton resolves the immunity issue in the present 
case. The construction, funding and development of projects like 
the Richards project is not such a unique function that it could 
not be performed by some construction or banking entity outside 
of the realm of government. 
This is further supported by the case of Thomas v. 
Clearfield City, 642 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982). Thomas v. Clearfield 
City determined that the maintenance of a city sewer system is 
not essential to the core of governmental activity. The Court 
reasoned that private concerns often maintain their own sewage 
systems and that the maintenance of a sewage system was not 
uniquely governmental or essential to the core of its activity. 
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By the same reasoning, the funding, construction and sale of the 
water system is not uniquely governmental or essential to the 
core of governmental activity. 
In addition, the violation of Utah Constitutional 
provisions (as alleged with respect to Palmer) and conspiracy to 
defraud (as alleged with respect to Lin) do not constitute 
governmental functions and are not essential to the core of 
governmental activity. 
D• Even if the Activities of the State Defendants 
Constituted a Governmental Function, Immunity 
Under the Act is Waived. 
1. Activities of the State Defendants are ministerial 
and not discretionary• 
Even when a governmental function is involved, if the 
activities undertaken by the governmental entity are ministerial 
rather than discretionary, immunity is waived• 
U.C.A. § 63-30-10(1) (a). The Utah Supreme Court has established 
a four-part test to measure whether the acts and decisions of 
government are purely discretionary. The test is: 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or 
decision necessarily involve a basic 
governmental policy, program, or objective? 
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or 
decision essential to the realization or 
accomplishment of that policy, program, or 
objective as opposed to one which would not 
change the course or direction of the policy, 
program, or objective? 
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(3) Does the act, omission, or decision 
require the exercise of basic policy 
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the 
part of the governmental agency involved? 
(4) Does the governmental agency involved 
possess the requisite constitutional 
statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do 
or make the challenged act, omission, or 
decision? 
Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 
1983) . 
Construing Little and other cases, the Utah Supreme 
Court, in Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985), held that, 
when a governmental employee performs a ministerial as opposed to 
a discretionary function, the individual is liable for his 
tortuous conduct. In Arguelles, the Court stated that 
"operational, routine everyday matters not requiring evaluation 
of broad policy factors and which only implement established 
policy are non-discretionary ministerial functions." Arguelles, 
supra, at 282-83. The Court ruled that a decision or action 
implementing a pre-existing policy is operational in nature and 
is undeserving of protection under the discretionary function 
exception to personal liability. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 
117 (Utah 1975), allowed an action against the State Highway 
Department where the Highway Department negligently constructed 
and designed of a highway project. The Court concluded that, 
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while the Highway Department acted in a "discretionary function" 
in deciding to build the highway and specifying its general 
location, the preparation of plans and specification and 
supervision of the work was not the performance of a 
discretionary function; rather it was the exercise of 
"ministerial duties" which thereby denied immunity to the Highway 
Department. 
Assuming for the purpose of argument that the 
Division's selection of which water construction and preservation 
projects to fund and plan constituted a discretionary function, 
once all policy level decisions had been made, the supervised 
construction of its system was ministerial. 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Division is 
mistaken in contending that Lin and Palmer cannot be sued in 
their individual and representative capacities. An individual 
defendant employed by a governmental entity is not immune from 
liability for his own tortuous behavior, unless the governmental 
agent was performing a "discretionary function." See Frank v. 
State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980), Schmitt v. Billings, 600 P.2d 
516 (Utah 1979). 
Furthermore, § 63-30-4(4) of the Act, provides that, 
even if the governmental employee was acting within the realm of 
discretionary function, that employee may be liable if the 
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employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice. It is 
only the governmental entity (the Division) that is immune from 
the negligent or intentional misrepresentations committed by 
employees within the scope of employment. U.C.A. § 63-30-
10(1)(f) (1985). 
When Section 63-30-4(4) and Arguelles are viewed 
together, a two-part basis exists for finding that Lin and Palmer 
are personally liable to Rock Products, and why the Division is 
liable for the manner in which Lin and Palmer interfered with 
Rock Products' prospective economic relations. First, Palmer was 
performing only non-discretionary "operational routine everyday 
matters" in determining that Rock Products would not be allowed 
to bid on state-funded water projects, which implicates the 
Division. Second, Palmer acted with "fraud or malice," thereby 
rendering him liable in his personal capacity under § 63-30-4(4) 
since he had no legitimate basis for blackballing Rock Products. 
The same analysis applies to Lin when he acted with fraud or 
malice in entering into his conspiracy to defraud. 
Bonding; 
The failure to file a cost bond undertaking was not a 
basis for the district court's dismissal of any of Rock Products7 
claims. The court's Order states: "Rock Product's Amended 
Third-Party Complaint is dismissed with prejudice, for the 
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reasons set forth in paragraphs 1-6 [of this Order].11 (See the 
Court's Order attached as Addendum lfBlf; R. 1775.) Only in 
paragraph seven of the Order does the Court mention the 
undertaking issue, and the court took no action based upon that 
issue. Id. In addition, the court stated at oral argument that 
it was not persuaded by the state's contention on the undertaking 
issue and that the failure to obtain a bond was not a significant 
oversight. (R. 2609). (Rock Products did file a $300.00 bond 
with the Court on January 21, 1988, prior to the hearing on the 
Division's Motion.) Consequently, it is assumed that this Court 
need not address the undertaking issue as a basis for dismissal 
of Rock Products causes of action. 
Even were this not the case, the Utah Supreme Court has 
ruled that "failure to pay the undertaking is an affirmative 
defense not properly raised in a rule 12(b) motion to 
dismiss . . . " Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 
1990) . In addition the actions undertaken by the State 
Defendants do not comprise "governmental functions," and, 
therefore, none of the provisions of the Act apply. See Dalton, 
supra, for example, when the Utah Supreme Court held that because 
the operation of a sewer system is not a governmental function 
under the Standi ford/Johnson test, the one-year statute of 
limitations provided for in § 63-3 0-15 of the Act had absolutely 
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no application to a negligence action brought against a 
governmental entity. 
S 1983 Notice: 
The notice provisions of the Act do not apply in this 
case because no governmental function is included. Even if a 
governmental function were involved, Rock Products' claim for 
relief under § 1983 derives from legislation passed by the United 
States Congress. As such, Rock Products' § 1983 claim can in no 
way be impaired or qualified by any state statute; such a statute 
would be unconstitutional under the supremacy clause of the 
United States Constitution. 
2. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act Expressly 
Waives Sovereign Immunity With Respect to Rock 
Products' Contract Cause of Action. 
Section 63-30-5 of the Act provides that "immunity from 
suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any contractual 
obligation". Therefore, Rock Products' contractual claims are 
not barred by the Act. 
POINT II 
A PLEADER IS REQUIRED ONLY TO MAKE A SHORT 
STATEMENT OP ITS CLAIM 
In order to render a decision on a Motion to Dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6), consideration must initially be given to 
Rules 8(a), 8(e) and 8(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Rule 8(a) sets out what a Complaint must contain in 
order to state a claim for relief: 
A pleading which sets forth a claim for 
relief . . . shall contain (1) a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a 
demand for judgment . . 
Rule 8(e)(1) provides that no technical forms of 
pleading are required; and Rule 8(f) requires that all pleading 
be construed to do substantial justice. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Burr v. Child, 2 65 P.2d 383, 
387 (Utah 1953), clearly indicated how these rules were to 
interpreted when it stated that: 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for 
the most part taken from the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, a pleader is required only 
to make a short and plain statement of its 
claim, U.R.C.P., Rule 8(a), and the 
requirement of technical exactness is 
excluded. Fine detail is not required. 
Porter v. Shoemaker, D.C, 6 F.R.D. 438, 10 
Fed. Rule Service, 8(a) Point 25, p. 51. In 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 Supreme 
Ct. 385, 38, 91 Lawyers Ed. 2d 451, Mr. 
Justice Murphey, discussing the federal 
rules, said: 
. . . the new rules . . . restrict the 
pleading to the task of general notice-
giving . . . 
All that is required by Rule 8, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
that the pleading give fair notice of the nature and basis of the 
claim and a general indication of the type of litigation 
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involved. See, Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d 157, 280 P.2d 
453, 455 (Utah 1955). Rule 8(a) is to be liberally construed in 
determining the sufficiency of a Complaint. See, Gill v. Timm, 
720 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Utah 1986). 
The policies underpinning Utah's pleading rules were 
further explicated in Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 
966, 971 (Utah 1982): 
It is evident from these statements that the 
fundamental purpose of our liberalized 
pleading rules is to afford parties "the 
privilege of presenting whatever legitimate 
intentions they have pertaining to their 
dispute," Cheney v. Ruckner, supra, subject 
only to the requirement that their adversary 
have "fair notice of the nature and basis or 
grounds of the claim and a general indication 
of the types of litigation involved." 
Blackham v. Snelgrove, supra. The functions 
of issue formulation and fact revelation are 
appropriately left to the deposition 
discovery process. The rule "allows 
examination into the settlement of all issues 
bearing upon the controversy," Cheney v. 
Ruckner, supra, with latitude for proof that 
extends beyond the pleading, where 
appropriate. Rule 15(b). It also appears 
from the decisions that these principles are 
applied with great liberality in sustaining 
the sufficiency of allegations stating a 
cause of action or an affirmative defense. 
[Emphasis added.] 
In light of the aforementioned principles, the Utah 
Court has stated that no motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 
shall be granted unless it appears to a certainty that the 
pleading party would be entitled to no relief under any state of 
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facts which could be proved in support of the claim. Blackham v. 
Snelgrove, supra, Christensen v. Automatic Transmission Serv., 
Inc., 467 P.2d 605, 607-608 (Utah 1970). Further, "on Motion to 
Dismiss a Complaint, the complainant is entitled to the benefit 
not only of the facts stated in the Complaint, but also of the 
legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom." Ellis v. Social 
Serv. Dept., Etc., 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980). For purposes of 
the Rule 12(b)(6), the pleading must be construed in the light 
most favorable to the pleading party, and the allegations 
contained in the pleading are taken as true. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, 
FED. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 1357, at 594 (1969). 
Under the foregoing standards regarding notice-pleading 
and the sufficiency of a Complaint in the face of a 12(b)(6) 
motion, Rock Products respectfully submits that its amended 
Complaint against the State Defendants is more than adequately 
pled to state claims for which Rock Products should be 
compensated. 
POINT III 
ROCK PRODUCTS7 COMPLAINT STATES AN ACTIONABLE CLAIM FOR 
BREACH OF THE CONTRACTUAL DUTY OWED ROCK PRODUCTS 
In order to determine whether a third party is a 
beneficiary under a contract, "the intent of the parties to the 
contract as evidenced by the contract itself and surrounding 
facts and circumstances" must be examined. Wasatch Bank of 
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Pleasant Grove v. Surety Ins. Co. of Cal., 307 P.2d 298, 300 
(Utah 1985); Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d 
1314, 1315 (Utah 1982); Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 
626 P.2d 453, 454 (Utah 1981). In this case, the Court took no 
evidence whatsoever in the form of affidavits or otherwise to 
reach its ruling. Since the allegations of the Complaint must be 
considered as true, the Court's attempt to look beyond the 
pleadings, particularly without taking evidence, was improper. 
The Supreme Court in the case of Schwinghammer v. 
Alexander, 446 P.2d 414, also recognized the third party 
beneficiary theory and classified third-party beneficiaries as 
falling into two categories: i) donee beneficiaries, and 
ii) creditor beneficiaries. With respect to creditor 
beneficiaries, the Court stated: 
If, on the other hand, the promisee's 
expressed intent is that some third party 
shall receive the performance and 
satisfaction and discharge of some actual or 
supposed duty or liability of the promisee, 
the third party is a creditor beneficiary. 
Id. at 415. 
While the facts in the Schwinghammer case are radically 
different from those in the instant case, a Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals case, using the same reasoning, concluded that a 
factual pattern similar to that alleged in this case created a 
third-party creditor beneficiary status. In Hamill v. Maryland 
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Cas. Co., 209 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1954), Hamill agreed to advance 
ten percent of any contracts awarded Gunnell Construction and 
approved by Hamill in consideration of ten percent of the net 
profits realized on any such contract• The Maryland Casualty 
Co., who provided Gunnell with a performance bond for a school 
construction project, successfully sought to recover money paid 
under the bond on the theory of third-party beneficiary to the 
Hamill-Gunnell contract. The Tenth Circuit Court stated: 
The intent to benefit the third person is 
generally said to be controlling, and it is 
to be gathered from a construction of the 
contract in light of the surrounding 
circumstances. Id. at 34 0. 
In Hamill, the Court concluded that such funding 
arrangements could form the basis of a third-party beneficiary 
claim and that the contract should be analyzed in relation to the 
surrounding circumstances. The Court concluded that Maryland 
Casualty was an intended third-party creditor beneficiary of the 
Hamill-Gunnell financing contract and reasoned as follows: 
If Maryland had furnished labor and materials 
on the project, Hamill would have undoubtedly 
been obligated to the extent of 10 percent of 
the contract price to Maryland and all others 
similarly situated. We think the liability 
is not different where Maryland furnished a 
bond to guarantee payment of the bills and 
did pay them in performance thereof. 
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 341. 
30 
The ruling by the Court in this case was improper 
because (i) the allegations of Complaint regarding intended 
third-party beneficiary for purposes of this Motion must be 
considered as true, and (ii) the Court could not, in any event, 
make determinations regarding intent from circumstances outside 
the Complaint without hearing evidence, which it did not. 
Rock Products also alleges that the State Defendants 
were acting as the agents and duly authorized representatives of 
Richards in dealing with Rock Products. The State Defendants 
therefore became active participants in the Richards contract. 
Thus, contractual duties and obligations existed on their part to 
Rock Products under the Richards contract as well. 
POINT IV 
ROCK PRODUCTS' COMPLAINT STATES ACTIONABLE CLAIMS 
FOR BREACH OP DUTY OP GOOD FAITH, FRAUD, AND 
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
Breach of Good Faith Duty. Rock Products has 
sufficiently pled a cause of action for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In Beck v. Farmers the 
Utah Supreme Court has further defined the good faith covenant 
obligation in St. Benedicts Dev. Co. v. St. Benedicts Hosp., 811 
P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah 1991). In that case, the court 
explained, 
under the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, each party impliedly promises that 
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he will not intentionally or purposely do 
anything which will destroy or injure the 
other party's right to receive the fruits of 
the contract. . . . To comply with his 
obligation to perform a contract in good 
faith, a party's actions must be consistent 
with the agreed common purpose and the 
justified expectations of the other party. 
. . The purpose, intentions, and expectations 
of the parties should be determined by 
considering the contract language and the 
course of dealincfs between and conduct of the 
parties. 
Id. at 199-200 (emphasis in original). 
Consequently, in Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 
795 (Utah 1985) , the Court allowed an action for breach 
of implied contractual duty of good faith, stating that the 
parties to a contract have "parallel obligations to perform the 
contract in good faith, obligations that inhere in every 
contractual relationship." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 801; see 
also Resource Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 
1028, 1037 (Utah 1985). Therefore, Rock Products has 
appropriately pled a breach by the Division of its contractual 
duty of good faith. The question of whether the Division 
breached this duty is a question to be determined by the trier of 
fact and is irrelevant to a 12(b)(6) motion. 
Fraud: 
Rock Products' cause of action for fraud against Lin 
contains all of the nine necessary elements required for this 
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cause of action- Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (Utah 
1952); Condor v. A.L. Williams & Assoc, 739 P.2d 634-637 (Utah 
App. 1987). The allegations in the Complaint state (1) that a 
representation was made pursuant to a mutual agreement between 
Lin and Widerberg; (2) concerning a presently existing material 
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either 
(a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation; 
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; 
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of 
its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby 
induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. (R. 500-501.) 
Rock Products' only burden to meet these elements is 
that the cause of action be pled with the necessary specificity 
as provided in Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Division did not challenge the specificity of 
the pleading and the Court made no ruling that the Complaint 
lacked specificity. The Division's argument that certain fraud 
elements are deficient is not a question of law (see R. 842-844, 
857-859, 1045.)2 Certainly reasonable reliance is usually a 
2The elements alleged to be deficient, (1) whether the 
representation is material; (2) whether Rock had a "right to rely," 
(3) whether the purpose of the representation was to induce Rock 
Products to act; and (4) whether Rock Products' reliance was 
reasonable are all questions of fact, not law. See Weigand v. 
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question of fact for the jury to determine, Condor at 638, citing 
Berkeley Bank for Coops, v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 
1980), as are other elements of a fraud cause of action. See, 
Pitman v. Larsen Distrib. Co., 724 P.2d 1379 (Colo. App. 1986) 
(inducement to act is a question of fact); Varady v. White, 595 
P.2d 272 (Colo. App. 1979) (misrepresentation and reliance are 
questions of fact); Pape v. Knoll, 687 P.2d 1087, review denied, 
690 P.2d 506 (Ore. App. 1984) (whether the misrepresentations 
were material is a question of fact). Also, whether the fraud in 
fact occurred before the signing of a contract or during the 
performance of a contract is irrelevant as to whether a cause of 
action for fraud exists. 
Negligent Misrepresentation: 
Negligent misrepresentation occurs 
where one having a pecuniary interest in a 
transaction, is in the superior position to 
know material facts, and carelessly or 
negligently makes a false representation 
concerning them, expecting the other party to 
rely and act thereon, and the other party 
reasonably does so and suffers loss in that 
transaction . . . .ff 
Culp Constr. Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d 650, 655 (Utah 
1990), citing, Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 423 P.2d 659, 662 
(Utah 1967). In cases where privity of contract exists, the duty 
Union Nat. Bank of Wichita, 610 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1980) (the existence 
of fraud is a question of fact). 
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to ensure the accuracy and validity of statements nearly always 
exists. Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 
P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 1983). Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated, "we recognize that in some cases the acts constituting a 
breach of contract may also result in breaches of duty that are 
independent of the contract and may give rise to causes of action 
and tort." Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 
1985). See, Restatement (2nd) of Torts § 552. 
Rock Products' Complaint clearly states (i) that Lin 
knew or should have known that the soil conditions of the 
properties were not as represented in the pre-bid conference, in 
the preconstruction conference, and in the specifications, 
(ii) that he was negligent in misrepresenting the same (R. 
503-505), (iii) that Rock Products relied upon such 
representations in entering into and performing work under the 
Richards Contract, (iv) that, as a result, Rock Products has 
incurred costs of approximately $116,000.00 that were not 
anticipated under the original bid, and (v) that Rock Products is 
entitled to repayment for the same. Id. The Complaint therefore 
properly states a cause of action in this regard. 
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POINT V 
ROCK PRODUCTS' COMPLAINT STATES ACTIONABLE CLAIMS 
FOR TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE WITH ROCK PRODUCTS' 
PROSPECTIVE AND PRESENT ECONOMIC RELATIONS. 
INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS. 
Contrary to the Division's position, the tort of 
interference with prospective economic relations "protects a 
party's interest in prospective relationships of economic 
advantage not yet reduced to a formal contract (and perhaps not 
expected to be)." Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 302 
(Utah 1982). Under this cause of action, the plaintiff must 
prove: "(1) that the defendant potentially interfered with the 
plaintiff's existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an 
improper purpose or by an improper means, (3) causing injury to 
plaintiff." Id. at 304. See also, Atkin, Wright & Mills v. 
Mountain State Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985). The 
improper purpose test can be satisfied by showing the defendants' 
"predominant purpose" is to harm the plaintiff rather than to 
advantage the defendant. Leigh Furniture, supra at 307-08. If 
the defendant interferes with the contract or with the contract 
rights for an unlawful purpose, he is not protected. Gammon v. 
Federated Milk Producers, 14 U.2d 291, 295-296, 383 P.2d 402, 406 
(Utah 1963) (unlawful price fixing). 
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A Utah jury can find the tort of interference with 
prospective business relations to be made where the evidence 
supports a finding either that the defendant intentionally 
interfered with the plaintiff's business relations by using an 
improper purpose for so doing or by using improper means for so 
doing. In the instant case, the facts can satisfy either basis 
for concluding that Palmer and the Division have tortuously 
interfered with Rock Products' prospective business relations. 
Rock Products' central contention is that Palmer attempted to 
improperly force Rock Products into a settlement with Richards by 
precluding Rock Products from engaging in any construction on 
Division-funded water projects. This would fit within the 
improper means standard since nowhere within the definition of 
powers and authorities under the Water and Irrigation Act, 7 3-
10-1 et seq. or elsewhere is the Division authorized to use such 
coercive tactics against a contractor. A jury may also be able 
to reasonably conclude that the Division acted out of an improper 
purpose in that its predominant purpose was to force resolution 
of a private dispute which is outside its legitimate scope of 
activity or to ruin Rock Products' business merely for the sake 
of injury alone. Such a finding would be justified since the 
Division was able to readily ascertain that the vast majority of 
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Rock Products' work last year came from employment on Division-
funded projects. 
Even if Rock Products were precluded from bringing a 
suit for damages because the Division and Palmer are shielded by 
the Act, Rock Products could still bring an action in equity 
seeking injunctive relief from the Court to stop the Division and 
Palmer from "blacklisting" Rock Products. It is well settled 
that governmental immunity is not a defense to an equitable claim 
in this state. Bowles v. State ex rel. Dept. of Trans., 652 P.2d 
1345 (Utah 1982). Where Rock Products attempts merely to enjoin 
the wrongful action on the part of the governmental agency, that 
action is essentially one in equity. 
It should be noted that Palmer's wrongdoings, even if 
intentional, can give rise to liability to the Division. Where 
Palmer was acting within the scope of his employment (and that is 
a factual determination), the Division is liable for his actions, 
see Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989), and 
where the Division ratifies his actions by failing to repudiate 
them (also a factual determination), the Division is similarly 
liable. Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 
1090 (1988). As the employees, agents and authorized 
representatives of the Division, performing ministerial rather 
than governmental functions (R. 491) and acting on behalf of the 
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Division (K, 515) as alleged in The Complaint , i,ne di'iiuiu. m i in 
and * t >nei bind and give rise to liability fin beha i t of the 
U i v - . 
INTERFERENCE WITH PRE8ENT ECONOMIC RELATIONS. 
The lit* ih Supreme Court has I indicated t h a t t h e t n r t 
a c t i o n t o r i n t e r ter^ncc * i I h "Hit J a r t 11 i «»' «rhf• 11 mi n <i t 
p e r s u a d e s a n o t h e r t o c o n s p i r e w i t h t h e f i r s t party Lu breach a 
I'I ntrar'T i< in in i th i ir i l -parf y annuel! \ ,BJ i Ls, 1 ( Utah 2d 8 J , 
i n , if) Pi I i i i i , n u , , i J > i p i t i j l i 1 i ' ) i i i n i if r if M i i i m t b t l J S 
sufficiently set forth the five elements foi interference with 
I i osrnt < • JIUJI'III r* 1 i» " n-- i articulated in Soter v. Wasatch 
L»ev. Corp»f 443 I . <!d 6n] (Utah 1 )f>8|, 
In nrder to succeed on this theory . the plaintiff must 
.ilinw 11M! ! lie * i *»t end.ml ni inn w.r. uinnqful and malicious and 
that actu.il damaqe resulted i rom the interference witn rhe 
plaintiff's right of contrail. First Security Bank , bright, 
met the requisite showing that the defendant had jeted 
J
" The five elements are: (l ) at the time of the defendant's 
a; : 'ts the plaintiff was a party to a valid contract with a third 
par ty ; (2) the defendant either knew or should have known of the 
existence of that contract; (3) the acts of the defendant in 
ii iducing the third party to breach the contract with the plaintiff 
were intentional; (4) the third party was induced *-* breach the 
contract with the plaintiff as a proximate : • * . - 'f "he 
defendant's acts; and (5) plaintiff suffered d^- . * >rt 
approximate result of the defendant's conduct. 
maliciously; however, the plaintiff was not able to show damage 
in that case. Rock Products has alleged both maliciousness and 
damage. The conspiracy to defraud Rock Products with respect to 
the sand as alleged against Lin, and the blacklisting by Palmer 
with regard to the Hadfield contract, certainly indicate malice, 
and Rock Products was substantially damaged as a retsult. 
Therefore, Rock Products has properly alleged that the Division 
tortuously interfered with the Richards and Hadfield contracts. 
The same arguments regarding the activities of Palmer 
binding the Division set forth above with respect to prospective 
economic relations apply to this cause of action. 
POINT VI 
ROCK PRODUCTS STATES AN ACTIONABLE CLAIM FOR 
CIVIL REMEDY DUE TO THE STATE DEPENDANTS' 
VIOLATION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
As stated in Point II above, Rock Products' allegation 
that the Division and Palmer violated the Utah Constitution, art. 
12, § 19 is sufficient in a notice-pleading jurisdiction such as 
Utah to give the State adequate notice of the claim being made 
against it. Rock Products has alleged that the Stctte violated 
this Constitutional provision which reads as follows: 
Every person in this State shall be free to 
obtain employment whenever possible, and any 
person, corporation, or agent, servant or 
employee thereof, maliciously interfering or 
hindering in any way, any person from 
obtaining or enjoying employment already 
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Section 1 " 
.btained, from any other corporation or 
person, shall be deemed guilty of a crime. 
The legislature sha . i provide by 
enforcemer r -vt r . -• sec t : ::r:, 
-i i d '.;:*s ah out: An ticle XI, 
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earning a livelihood, sc tha* tf *3]:r,r; 
must of necessity work for other, provided 
Article XIT. sprtion 19 of the Utah State 
Constituticr I:very person in th is State 
shall be tree *.: Dbtain employment whenever 
possible, . . . M and declared any malicious 
interference tnerewith tc be prohi bited. 
This freedom to wcr>: complements and makes 
more meaningful the other rights guaranteed 
— a part of our const • tutic-*:al liberties. . 
j]reat caution must: be observed in 
permict ing encroachments upon b a s ; : rights„ 
assured bv the cr?*' iriiti-^^ 
S tat e 
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\) (refusing to preempt a blacklisting claim 
Sect:on 19 and recoqni z ia the neve is 
arguably conferring a state-law riqht ur 
any right establ i shed by contract. 
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Products to obtain essential employment because of its inability 
to obtain bonded work as a result of the acts of Palmer amounts 
to the deprivation of a fundamental right that this 
Constitutional provision sought to prevent. Rock Products should 
be allowed to pursue this claim. 
It has long been recognized through judicial 
interpretation that a constitutional provision can give rise to a 
cause of action absent legislative creation or approval. The 
U.S. Supreme Court recognized this private right of action in 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 43 U.S. 388, 29 
L. Ed. 2d 619, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971). Bivens determined that the 
victim of a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights may recover 
damages against the violator in Federal Court despite the absence 
of any statute conferring such a remedy. In another case of 
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239-243, 60 L. Ed.2d 846, 99 
S. Ct. 2264, 2274-2276 (1979), the Court stated that it is more 
willing to imply a right of action from the Constitution than 
from an Act of Congress. Courts also often allow a civil remedy 
simply based upon disciplinary and regulatory statutes, as in the 
case of the Courts fashioning civil remedies in federal 
securities violation cases. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 
426, 84 S. Ct. 1555 (1964); S.E.C. v. National Sees., Inc., 393 
U.S. 453, 89 S. Ct. 564 (1969). The violation by the Division 
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and Palmer of this provision ,.1 the* "JI.JIJI <..>r.'d itn1, ion Ie\,A i ves 
Rock Products ot i valid property right, 
1 '/en i! i « r mi i na I fi<Tnilty «v * P imposed by *1IP 
legislature for this kind M( conduct, 1 IInit penalty wc-uilJ r 1 
preclude Rock Products from bringing a civil action for damages 
,i s a r e s 11 i i MI I I I IS I until 111 11111»i m 1 111 i 11 i' i f i S i 11 i e I I" i c- S t a t e 
l e g i s l a t u r e - *~ " i n o e A n n , f) i 4 - z' 4 - * m a d e i tie v i o l a t i o n oi 
this ^~ * - * - •> : - 'Vision a felony, its expressed intent with 
respe^ tl "IM| H. inn . wniilid n nv«> appii .it inn in 
this ^se It*- -rimiral code contained in 111 ah Code Ann. 
* <s particular application to this case. 
. . 2 ,tc _ * • inert; i rient, par t, 
"is Joe-* not bar, suspena :• . t.ne:*lse 
affect any right or liability to damages, 
penalty, forfeiture, impeachment, or other 
remec\ authorized by 1 aw to be recovered 
enforce , , «, oil va 1 action. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The State Legislature has also provided, in I Ml .n I lb 
Ann. $ 68-1-4, that "when +he violation of a right admits both of 
i i i , in I ™i in 11II MI i i i i i i i . i l 1 eiiiHi I, I IIM i nihil i n pi D s e c u t e i s n o t m e r g e d 
in the othoi," This statute supports Rock Products' argument 
that, while a criminal remedy for violation of this statute has 
been Leg i s I at i n I y i mpusu ii „ t,!i r> , • i \ mi I i o m e d y n i 1 /^n t" ho I" f ended 
party is not merged with that criminal remedy and a separate 
civil action exists. 
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Finally, the Constitution states that it applies to any 
person, corporation, servant, or employee; this would obviously 
include a public servant such as Palmer and a governmental entity 
such as the Division. 
The Court should be particularly reluctant to uphold 
the dismissal of this claim based upon the authority cited above, 
Electrical Constr. & Maint. Co. supra, in view of the novel 
theory of recovery of this claim. 
POINT VII 
ROCK PRODUCTS STATES AN ACTIONABLE CLAIM AGAINST LIN 
AND PALMER FOR VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
A plaintiff, suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, had only to 
make a short and plain statement of essential elements of his 
claim in his complaint. The complaint will survive dismissal 
unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. 
Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (1st Cir., 1983), citing 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1982); Richardson v. 
Flemming, 651 F.2d 366 (5th Cir., 1981). Indeed, in order to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983, the 
complaint must only show that a deprivation of a right that is 
secured by the constitution or laws of the United States. Bradt 
v. Smith, 634 F.2d 796, 799 (5th Cir., 1981). 
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the const r ,.:r: :* ir-: **<.f , .*=?.: .v.-a -- trcauCt^ : * property 
interest without due process of law in violation of the" 
I- our. I ee nl In Miitunliiieiiil l i I In 1 hiii i 1 cill I t . i l o s " unisf 11 i l l i n n ^/hi ' i i in 
defrauded Rock Products of the value ot the material (sand) M 
installed Property interests arise from sources of state law or 
mutual understand m q n • .4.J:on t, online i I'JIJ i I i n f i 'unvi , i|L ' i , 
896 F.2d 1228, II il (10th I'JF, lu9tj|, In addition, 
reprpsent-.it ! nni made by I in tn Rock Product'-; created i "mutual 
understanding11 I'u provide a basis lui IKotk ll'i udui. L ' b propeil y 
interest to the funds to which Rock Pi oducts was fraudulently 
11 r o m i s e < 1 111 in l M M ' e i v <f M I 11 i • i, nin | )e n n a t mi i Set* Compu ter Sciences 
Corp. v . / barra , b8 S F . Supp , > 4 6 , ." '32 -55 n 11 . Co i u . i >l\ * n . i * 
Products has alleged that l.in induced Rock Products to eontiir *-.*. 
p e r t > ' rman ' M u r n i e " i *"* i i ! \ ' i i « 1> I• •- i ' n | i n t i m i t - p n i 
honoring n R, sno-bul in Ptimet, acting under the color of 
state law violated % 19R i when lie removed Rock Products 1 rom the 
11 i \/ i s i o n p j n lipid i i i i e i l i i nil r a i i o 111 l nil. 11 HI l 
12, § 19 of the Constitution of Utah Palmer intentionally 
deprived Rock Products of the benefits ot 1 "',e Hadfield oont t* iet 
and I pi nspe i 1 i n i i in n i mil! 11 i nip II uyi i ienl Win in P a l m e ! i m m 1 mil Pnolk 
Products trom the D i v i s i o n ' s p r e - q u a ] i t l e d r o n t r a c t o i s l i d he 
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deprived Rock Products of a property interest in violation of a 
constitutionally protected right, (R. 522-523•) 
Under a motion to dismiss, the Court is obligated to 
accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint. The 
presumption, in conjunction with the standard of review for 
§ 1983 actions set forth above, establishes the legal sufficiency 
of Rock Products' claims under § 1983. 
Lin and Palmer's immunity claims are equally misplaced. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that state officials may 
be sued in their individual capacities, while acting in their 
official capacities under § 1983. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. , 
116 L. Ed. 2d 301, 112 S. Ct. (1991). 
As to Lin's and Palmer's claims of common-law immunity, 
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 
L. Ed.2d 396 (1982), the United States Supreme Court enunciated 
an objective test for the determination of qualified immunity in 
order to "avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the 
resolution of many and substantial claims on summary judgment." 
457 U.S. at 818, 102 S. Ct„ at 2738. Qualified immunity is not 
properly an issue for a motion to dismiss. In Harlow, the Court 
articulated the following standard: 
Government officials performing discretionary 
functions generally are shielded from 
liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established 
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statutory or constitutional ri ghts of wh i ch a 
r e a s o n a b 1 e p e r s o n w o 1 i ] d h a v e k n o w i 1 
4 57 U. S. at 81 7-1 8 (citations ai id f ooti lote omitted) . 
Assun i ng a ] 1 facts favorable to Rock Products, Li n and 
Pa 1 met canine »l meel t:l: ie H a i: I :: v ' s t : andar I set f s r th abo^ e 
CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated by the fo-regoing arguments, the court 
S l ' K l t i IL i i r i M . ^ b e I 1 11 I  "» I -i t . I" 1 I ' I < "i I I I 1 i n II i J I M I 1 I t I I. t l I . I I I , I I  II I h 
of the far* that it was entered with preiudire without the 
oppottunitv of Rock Product1! tn rorrrct any technical 
deficiencies as would have been ptupei Uo\ h h"<|in is 
respectfully requests the Court to reverse the District Court's 
ruder and deny I lie "if'atn D P bondant i;"" IMnl i m to Dismiss. 
Respecttu 1 1 y submitted this I Ith day ut January, I'iyj, 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
DAVID L. ""BARCLAY 
NATHAN R. HYDE 
Attorneys for Rock i^bducts 
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P. KEITH NELSON [A2391] 
DAVID L. BARCLAY [A0200] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Third-Party Plaintiff 
VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS CO. 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
SALT .VAKE CC.iNH.UTAH 
AUG 3 4 33 PH '87 
11 X I . H t-N.". 1 > rim 
5-. p-'.i :•••-^' 
e ':. c i' «, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., a 
Utah Corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS 
CO., and INTEGON INDEMNITY 
CORPORATION, a Foreign Corporation 
Defendants. 
VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS 
COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., a Utah Cor-
poration, also known as RICHARDS IRRI-
GATION CO., DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, a division or 
agency of the State of Utah, PETER T. 
LIN, MARVIN L. WIDERBERG, W. JAMES 
PALMER, LORNA M. ALDER, L. REED ALDER, 
DOES I THROUGH AND INCLUDING XXX, 
LAVONNE ANDERSON, ROBERT L. ANDERSON, 
SAMUEL S. ARENTZ, III, TRUDIE C. ARENTZ, 
FRANK D. BAGLEY, MARLENE L. BAGLEY, 
CAMILLE BANKHEAD, J. KEITH BANKHEAD, 
ARLEEN E. BECKSTROM, GORDON M. BECKSTROM, 
BONNIE J. BEHR, ROLAND W. BEHR, STEPHEN 
H. BENNETT, MARLENE C. BENNETT, CLARICE 
AMENDED 
THIRD-PARTY 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. C87-2390 
Judge David S. Young 
•^ j 
R. BOGGESS, ELDIN W. BOGGESS, REID L. 
BOGGESS, ALAN M. BORG, PATRICIA G. BORG, 
DOROTHY G. BOULTON, MARIE F. BRADSHAW, 
RULON H. BRADSHAW, CONNIE P. BRINTON, W. 
ROBERT BRINTON, DON N. BROUGH, VERDELLA 
B. BROUGH, DEBRA BURCH, DEE P. 
BUTTERFIELD, EDNA B. BUTTERFIELD, STEWART 
L. CARLSON, CHERRILL J. CARLSON, PHYLLIS 
R. CHILD, RALPH CHILD, GRANT M. 
CHRISTENSEN, CORPORATION OF PRESIDING 
BISHOP CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER 
DAY SAINTS, CALVIN H. CLARK, GLORIA A. 
CLARK, GRACE S. CLAYTON, LON G. CLAYTON, 
MAVIS G.CLAYTON, RONALD K.CLIFFORD, WENDY 
L. CLIFFORD, MARY E. CONDIE, ROBERT A. 
CONDIE, DONALD V. COOK, NANCY L. S. COOK, 
GERALD A.DAMRON, MAE JEAN P.DAMRON, KAYE 
0. DEMERIS, PETE DEMERIS, DIAL BUILDERS, 
INC., a Utah corporation, KELVIN J.DRAKE, 
RUTH DRAKE and/or her Estate, BUD D. DUNN 
BURNETTA P. DUNN, DOROTHY E. ECKER, 
RAY ECKER, ORLAND N. EDDINS, MILTON L. 
ELDREDGE, MIRIAM B.ELDREDGE, LILA E.EMERY 
FLORA S. ERICKSON, FREDRICK D. ERICKSON, 
HELEN M. ERICKSON, THOMAS H. ERICKSON, 
PAULETTA D. EWAN, E. GREENWOOD FAMP, 
CAROLYN R. FERICKS, FRANKLIN H. FERICKS, 
ANN C. FORBUSH, JAY M. FORBUSH, MARY E. 
FORBUSH, DAVID R. FREE, DAVID G. FREE, 
DEANNA E.FREE, JONI L.FREE, SANDRA D.FUNK 
JAY W. GALLI, MARY J. GALLI, GARY L. GEE, 
MARVA GEE, BARBARA L. GLEASON, JOHN S. 
GLEASON, JR., LOWELL C. GREER, PEARL G. 
GREER, MILDRED V. GREER, PAUL A. GREER, 
ROBERT C. GREER, DOROTHY B. HALE, 
ELLSWORTH H. HALE, DIANE M. HANSEN, DREW 
W. HANSEN, EVAN W. HANSEN, GENEVA B. 
HANSEN, MERRILL G. HANSEN, GARY R. HANSON 
DEANNE HANSON, FRANK HARADA, A. WESLEY 
HARDY, RUTH B. HARDY, BLAKE E. HAWS, 
MELISSA B. HAWS, MARIAN F. HAWS, JULIA R. 
HEDMAN, GLEN L. HENSON, KATHRYN G. HENSON 
CLARA HILTON, H. RAY HILTON, B. DEAN 
HOGGAN, SHIRLEY L. HOGGAN, DIANE D. 
HOLBROOK, DONALD HOLBROOK, LAUREL D. 
HOLMES, WENDELL T. HOLMES, BERNIECE 
HOPKINS, BRENDA M. HOWCROFT, HAROLD T. 
HOWCROFT, KENNETH B. HOWCROFT, SHIRLEY D. 
HOWCROFT, RAYMOND D., INGERSOL, WILMA D. 
INGERSOL, KAREN ISRAELSEN, GLEN R.JACKSON 
YVONNE JACKSON, MARGENE D. JACOBSON, 
WALLACE V. JACOBSON, GLEN E. JESSOP, DALE 
L.JEWKES, LUCILE T.JEWKES, J.DEAN JOHNSON 
J.G.HENRY JOHNSON, JUNE H.JOHNSON, SHARON 
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JOHNSON, RAY L. KENNEY, VONA D. KENNEY, 
DAVID L. KEZERIAN, GAYLE, P. KEZERIAN, 
BLANE T. KIMBALL, LA RENE G. KIMBALL, 
RONALD W. KING, CLAUDIA L. KING, CHARLES 
M. KOEHN, JOYCE E. KOEHN, VIOLET L. 
KOEHN, WILLIAM KOEHN, OWEN C. LAMBERT, 
VIRGINIA S. LAMBERT, GARY F. LARSEN, 
SUZANNE W. LARSEN, DELORES N. LEWIS, GENE 
A. LEWIS, CONSTANCE L. LIEBER, WILFORD K. 
LIEBER, KEITH LOCKWOOD, WANDA R. LOCKWOOD 
JOHN LOMBARDI, RUTH E. LOMBARDI, ALVIN R. 
LUNDGREN, JOYCE LUNDGREN, GAIL J. 
LUNDSKOG, PARLEY J. LUNDSKOG, BRUCE E. 
MACKAY, GAIL MACKAY, CARLOS N. MADSEN, 
MARGARET Y. MADSEN, CLEALON B. MANN, 
NANELL H. MANN, SANDY L. MARTIN, GEORGE 
M. MATTHEWS, PATSY MATTHEWS, FAYE D. 
MCNEIL, RICHARD S. MCNEIL, JACQUELINE E. 
MEISTER, JAN MEISTER, MAX L. MENLOVE, 
NANCY L. MENLOVE, DARLEEN M. MERRIHEW, 
JOHN E. MERRIHEW, M. PAUL MERTLICH, RUTH 
E. MERTLICH, CAROL L. MEYER, ROBERT A. 
MEYER, EMMA MOUNTEER, KENNETH E. 
MOUNTEER, IRENE W. NICKLE, JAMES L. 
NICKLE, and/or his Estate, NEAL NORMAN, 
STEVEN R. OAKESON, DOUGLAS D. OLSEN, 
SHARRON R. OLSEN, DONNA S. PACKER, EDSON 
F. PACKER, SHARON B. PACKER, JIM PAPPAS, 
CHERIE PARDOE, J. FRANK PARDOE, CHAUNCEY 
E. PENFOLD, FLORENCE L. PENFOLD, KATHLEEN 
C. PERRIN, YVES R. PERRIN, CLIFTON D. 
PETERSON, THELMA W. PETERSON, DOROTHY M. 
PIERCE, ERNEST PIERCE, VIRGINIA 0. RAY, 
WILLIAM R. RAY, SANDRA REMINDER, DALE 
RIDD, MARTA L. RIDD, JACQUELINE RIDDELL, 
PAUL A. RIDDELL, VERA B. RITCHIE, GEORGE 
G. ROBINSON, JOYCE ROBINSON, JOHN S. 
RUTTER, PAULA A. RUTTER, HELEN SASS, 
DELMA G. SAUNDERS, WAYNE E. SAUNDERS, 
ELEANOR L. SAVAGE, J.R. SAVAGE, DUANE 
SHAW, MARCHELLE M. SHAW, NATALIE SHAW, 
JOYCE R. SHELL, HAZEL A. SMITH, EILEEN P. 
STROUD, WALTER A. STROUD, GARY P. 
SYMKOVIAK, NAOMI N. SYMKOVIAK, PAUL F. 
SYMKOVIAK, DIXIE R. TAYLOR, GARY L. 
TAYLOR, MARCENE F. TAYLOR, ROBERT E. 
TAYLOR, ILENE D. TEA, MICHAEL H. TEA, 
CHARLEE H. THOMPSON, WAYNE A. THOMPSON, 
FRANK TRUNZO, SUSAN TRUNZO, CHRISTINE C. 
TUELLER, RUSSELL E. TUELLER, HOWARD H. 
TULLIS, JULIANNE TULLIS, MARNE W. TUTTLE, 
CAROL A. TYCKSEN, CECIL A. TYCKSEN, 
CHARLES VAN VALKENBURG, WAYNE VAN 
VALKENBURG, HAROLD P. VORDOS, SUSAN M. 
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VORDOS, GERALD C. WEBB, JOANN G. WEBB, 
LINDA M. WEBB, SIEGFRIED A. WEISS, DONA 
I. WEST, JOHN D. WEST, JOHN M. WEST, 
MARLENE P. WEST, FERROL S. WHITMORE, REX 
G. WHITMORE, ISABEL C. WIDERBERG, EUNICE 
M. WILKINSON, ROBERT G. WILKINSON, JR., 
IRENE S. WRIGHT, OWEN H. WRIGHT, MARVIN 
C. ZITTING, RHEA S. ZITTING 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Third-Party Plaintiff and Defendant under the within 
Complaint, VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS COMPANY (hereinafter 
referred to as "Rock Products11) hereby complains and alleges 
against the above-named Third-Party Defendants as follows: 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. VES A. KARREN is a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah, 
doing business under the name of ROCK PRODUCTS COMPANY, with 
its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., also known as RICHARDS 
IRRIGATION CO. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as 
"Richards") has heretofore filed a Complaint in the within 
proceedings and has alleged therein that it is a Utah 
corporation with its business being conducted in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
3. PETER T. LIN (hereinafter sometimes referred to as 
"Lin") is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. MARVIN L. WIDERBERG (hereinafter sometimes referred to 
as "Widerberg") is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
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5. W. JAMES PALMER (hereinafter sometimes referred to as 
"Palmer") is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
6. All of the remaining above-named individual 
Third-Party Defendants with the exception of SAMUEL S. ARENTZ, 
III, TRUDIE C. ARENTZ, CHAUNCEY F. PENFOLD, FLORENCE L. 
PENFOLD, and HAZEL A. SMITH, are residents of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. DIAL BUILDERS, INC., is a Utah corporation 
doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. THE 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS, also known as "CORPORATION OF 
PRESIDING BISHOP CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS" 
is a Utah corporation, doing business in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. RUTH DRAKE may be deceased, in which event the 
defendant in this case shall be her estate. JAMES L. NICKLE 
may be deceased, in which event the defendant in this case 
shall be his estate. 
7. SAMUEL S. ARENTZ, III AND TRUDIE C. ARENTZ are 
residents of Reno, Nevada; CHAUNCEY F. PENFOLD and FLORENCE L. 
PENFOLD are residents of Youngsville, Louisiana; and HAZEL A. 
SMITH is a resident of Wendover, Utah. 
8. Other than a) the DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the 
"Division"), b) Lin, and c) Palmer, all of the above-named 
Third-Party Defendants, (hereinafter sometimes referred to 
collectively as "Property Owners") own real property located in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and appointed Richards as 
their duly authorized agent for the installation of the 
below-described pressurized water irrigation system upon or 
about the below-described "Properties." 
9. On or about the 23rd day of June, 1986, Richards 
executed a contract (hereinafter referred to as "Richards 
Contract") for the installation of a pressurized water 
irrigation system (hereinafter referred to as the "System") on 
or about the properties (hereinafter referred to as 
"Properties") more particularly described in Exhibit "A" to a 
mechanic's lien, entitled Notice of Lien, dated February 11, 
1987, and recorded in the official records of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on February 12, 1987, as Entry or Reference No. 
440113 0, which has heretofore been amended a) by a document 
entitled Amendment to Notice of Lien dated February 20, 1987, 
and recorded in the official records of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, on February 20, 1987, as Entry or Reference No. 
4405010, and b) by a document entitled Second Amendment to 
Notice of Lien dated March 31, 1987, and recorded in the 
official records of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on March 
31, 1987, as Entry or Reference No. 4428303. A true and 
correct copy of the foregoing lien documents (hereinafter 
referred to collectively as "Lien") are attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference collectively as Exhibit "1." 
To avoid repetitiveness, only Exhibit "A" to the Notice of 
Lien, Exhibit "2" to the Amendment to Notice of Lien, and 
Exhibits "AA" and "BB" to the Second Amendment to Notice of 
Lien are attached as part of Exhibit "1". 
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10. At all times mentioned in this Amended Third-Party 
Complaint, Lin and Palmer were acting as an employees, 
agents and authorized representatives of the Division. At 
all times mentioned herein the Division was not performing a 
governmental function, and the Division, Lin and Palmer were 
acting in a purely ministerial capacity. At all times 
mentioned herein, Widerberg and Lin were acting as the agents 
and authorized representatives of Richards. On April 30, 1987, 
Rock Products filed a notice with the Division and with the 
Attorney General of the State of Utah as provided in Utah Code 
Anno. Section 16-30-11 and Section 16-30-12 with respect to 
those matters set forth below in the First Cause of Action, 
Third Cause of Action, Fourth Cause of Action, Seventh Cause of 
Action, Eighth Cause of Action, Ninth Cause of Action, Tenth 
Cause of Action, Eleventh Cause of Action, Twelfth Cause of 
Action, and Thirteenth Cause of Action. However, Rock Products 
stated in said notice that it did not consider the provision of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act to apply to the claims set 
forth below and was not waiving its right to assert that 
position by virtue of filing such notice. 
11. In connection with the installation of the System, the 
Division entered into a contract (hereinafter referred to as 
"Division Contract") with Richards whereby the Division agreed, 
among other things, as follows: 
a. To provide 85% of the funds necessary to pay the 
purchase price of the System under the Richards Contract, 
with Richards to reimburse the Division with interest 
for such funds over time through water charges to its 
shareholders; 
b. To design and provide a lay-out of the System, and 
to prepare specifications, plans and bidding documents with 
respect to the System; 
c. To provide the engineering for the System and 
supervise construction thereof. 
In contracting for and providing such services, the Division 
became and acted in the capacity of the agent and duly 
authorized representative of Richards. Rock Products was a 
third party beneficiary under the Division Contract by virtue 
of becoming the successful bidder and contractor with respect 
to the System. 
12. Certain specifications (hereinafter referred to as 
"Specifications") prepared by the Division dated May of 1986, 
constitute an integral part of the Richards Contract. A copy 
of said Richards Contract, including said Specifications, is 
attached as an exhibit to Rock Products Answer and Counterclaim 
on file in these proceedings. 
13. Pursuant to the terms of the Richards Contract, the 
initial purchase price of the System was to be $351,612.00; 
work commenced on the System on July 9, 1986, and continued, 
with the System essentially, or substantially, completed as of 
November 21, 1986, with the last finishing work performed by 
Rock Products on or about December 23, 1986. 
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14. On June 6, 1986, a pre-bid conference (hereinafter 
referred to as "Pre-Bid Conference") was conducted by Widerberg 
and Lin. On June 16, 1986, a pre-construction conference 
(hereinafter referred to as "Pre-Construction Conference") was 
also conducted by Lin and Widerberg. At the conferences, Lin 
and Widerberg described the bidding and construction 
requirements and the general configuration, nature, lay-out, 
quantities of material and needs of the System. 
15. During the period of July 9, 1986, through and includ-
ing November 21, 1986, the amount of said $351,612.00 was 
increased by approximately $217,023.51 with respect to the 
following items: 
a. $105,203.95 representing requested change orders 
by Richards. 
b. $45,988.35 representing increases in the 
quantities of materials necessary to install the System 
above and beyond those set forth in the original 
Specifications due to the understatement in the 
Specifications of the quantities of materials needed to 
install the System. 
c. $65,831.21 of additional costs due to changed 
conditions from those set forth in the Specifications and 
as disclosed to Rock Products by Lin and Widerberg at the 
Pre-Bid Conference and due to misrepresentations of 
conditions contained in the Specifications and made to Rock 
Products at the Pre-Bid Conference. 
Therefore, the total purchase price of the System under the 
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Richards Contract was $568,635.51. Richards and the Division 
1) were aware of the foregoing change orders, increased 
quantities, changed conditions and misrepresentation of 
conditions, 2) consented and agreed to such change orders and 
additional quantities, and 3) are bound and obligated by the 
increased costs set forth in this paragraph 15. 
16. To date, Richards has paid Rock Products the sum of 
$438,248.85, leaving an unpaid balance, exclusive of interest, 
attorney's fees and costs, of $130,386.66. 
17. Section 14.7 of the Specifications provides that 
interest shall be paid on any portion of the purchase price 
under the Richards Contract that is retained. The Richards 
Contract contemplates that such interest shall be calculated at 
a reasonable rate in accordance with prevailing interest rates 
considering all circumstances, including the risks involved. 
In accordance with the risks involved, 13.5% per annum is a 
reasonable rate under the circumstances. Rock Products is, 
therefore, entitled to interest on said unpaid balance of the 
Richards Contract in the amount of $7,912.19, through and 
including April 30, 1987. Rock Products is further entitled to 
interest on said $130,386.66 unpaid balance at the rate of 
13.5% per annum or $48.22 per day from April 30, 1986, until 
such funds are fully paid. 
18. As a third-party beneficiary under the Division 
Contract, Rock Products is entitled to payment of 85% of the 
purchase price of the System under the Richards Contract, or 
$483,340.18, which leaves a balance due and owing to Rock 
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Products from the Division of $45,091.33. In addition, Rock 
Products is entitled to interest on said $45,091.3 3 from the 
due date thereof until it is paid at the rate of 13.5% per 
annum, together with 85% of the attorney's fees and costs due 
Rock Products by Richards. 
19. Part of the increased costs over said $351,612.00 
constitutes additional sand for bedding of the System. 
Approximately two weeks after the commencement of construction 
of the System, it became apparent to Rock Products (a) that the 
nature of the soil in which the System was to be installed was 
far rockier than was represented by Lin and Widerberg to Rock 
Products at the Pre-Bidding Conference and at the 
Pre-Construction Conference and than was implied in the 
Specifications and (b) that the quantities of sand that would 
be required for the System were significantly greater than the 
quantities of sand represented to be necessary by Lin and 
Widerberg at the Pre-Bid Conference and at the Pre-Construction 
Conference and as implied in the Specifications upon which 
bidding was based. Representations were made by Lin and 
Widerberg at said conferences that, for the most part, native 
material could be used for backfilling without the necessity of 
screening or processing. 
20. Pursuant to a meeting between a representative of Rock 
Products, Lin and Widergerg held on or about July 23, 1986, 
Rock Products objected to the misrepresentations as to the 
condition of the soil and quantities of sand required. 
Consequently, Lin and Widerberg agreed that the total quantity 
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of the sand would be exceeded and that Richards would pay for 
such additional quantities of sand. Lin and Widerberg further 
agreed that Rock Products could charge a unit price per cubic 
yard associated with the installation of such additional sand 
higher than the unit price contained in the bid in connection 
with the installation of the original quantity of sand set 
forth in the Specifications, so long as the higher unit price 
associated with the installation of the additional sand was 
reasonable considering relevant factors. Such relevant factors 
include, but are not necessarily limited to, the cost of the 
sand itself, associated sand hauling charges, and costs 
associated with hauling away native material removed from the 
trenches. Considering the factors involved, the unit price of 
$8.25 per cubic yard for the additional sand is fair and 
reasonable. On August 12, 1986, it was further agreed by Lin 
and Widerberg that an inspector to be provided by the Division 
would sign, on a daily basis, for the quantities of sand 
utilized in the bedding of the System. This process was 
thereafter followed by Rock Products until the Division 
withdrew its inspector from the job. Such withdrawal occurred 
without the consent of Rock Products. 
21. Based upon the foregoing agreement regarding sand, an 
additional 6,196 cubic yards of sand at an additional cost of 
$51,117.00 was utilized beyond the quantities set forth in the 
Specifications. 
22. On or about October 13, 1986, Widerberg approached 
Rock Products and stated that, if Rock Products intended to 
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claim additional charges due to the need for quantities of 
asphalt beyond the quantities set forth in the Specifications, 
Rock Products should cease work on the asphalt and that 
Richards would take over the installation of asphalt with 
respect to the System from that point forward. On or about 
October 17, 1986, Rock Products notified Richards of its intent 
to file such a claim, and, thereafter, Richards undertook to 
install all asphalt with respect to the System. Such remaining 
asphalt work represented approximately 10% to 15% of the total 
asphalt work under the Richards Contract. 
23. The procedure for installing detectable tape in the 
System under the Richards Contract was to install the same 
concurrently with the installation of asphalt, in order that 
the tape not be installed and later disturbed due to asphalting 
excavation and related activities. Therefore, Richards 
undertook responsibility for installing the detectable tape 
throughout the remainder of the System for which it assumed 
asphalting responsibility. 
24. Despite repeated demands upon Richards to pay the 
outstanding balance under the Richards Contract, it has failed 
and refused to do so and has therefore materially breached its 
obligations thereunder. Pursuant to paragraph 15.3 of the 
Specifications, upon any failure of Richards to make payment as 
required under the Richards Contract, Rock Products has the 
right to cease all work until payment for all amounts due is 
paid. Rock Products has offered to make any needed repairs or 
corrections to the System for which it may have responsibility 
-13-
under the Richards Contract if the purhcase price under the 
Richards Contract is fully paid. 
25. Lin, Widerberg, and, consequently, the Division and 
Richards were aware 1) that Rock Products had posted a bond 
(hereinafter referred to as "Bond"), a copy of which is 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit 
"3", with respect to the completion of the System and 2) that 
Rock Products had contracted with numerous subcontractors and 
materialmen for the supply of materials and labor with respect 
to installation of the System. Lin, Widerberg and, 
consequently, the Division and Richards were further aware 
that, in the event the full purchase price under the Richards 
Contract was not promptly paid, Rock Products would not be able 
to pay such subcontractors and materialmen who would, in turn, 
make a claim against such bond. 
26. To date, various claims have been filed against the 
Bond, including, but not necessarily limited to, a claim by 
Monroe, Inc. in the approximate amount of $4,379.98, a claim by 
W. R. White Co. in the approximate amount of $51,355.81, and a 
claim by Rich L. Thomas dba Rich L. Thomas Asphalt Company in 
the approximate amount of $25,805.53, with respect to work and 
materials provided in the installation of the System. 
27. It was reasonably anticipated by Lin, Widerberg and, 
consequently, by the Division and Richards that, in the event 
the full purchase price of the Richards Contract was not 
promptly paid, and such claims were made against the Bond, Rock 
Products would lose its ability to be bonded until such matters 
were resolved, which loss has eventually occurred. As a 
result, Rock Products has been precluded from participating in 
bidding on bonded projects, and Rock Products has sustained 
damages as a result thereof in an amount to be established in 
accordance with proof to be presented at the time of trial, but 
in no event less than $100,000.00. 
28. In addition, Rock Product's reputation in the 
community and the business relationship with its subcontractors 
and materialmen have been injured, and Rock Products has 
sustained damages in regard thereto in an amount to be 
established in accordance with proof to be presented at the 
time of trial. 
29. At the Pre-Bid Conference, Widerberg represented that 
Richards had the installation of the System "cleared" with Salt 
Lake County and that, due to certain offset rights that 
Richards had, the construction permit for installing the System 
would be obtained at no cost to Richards or to the contractor 
installing the System and, therefore, that the cost of a 
construction permit need not be included in the bid or purchase 
price under the Richards Contract. 
30. When the foregoing representation with respect to the 
permit subsequently proved to be untrue, Rock Products paid 
approximately $3,900.00 for the permit, but Richards now 
refuses to pay for the same. 
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Conspiracy and Scheme to Defraud) 
(Lin and Widerberg) 
31. By way of its first Cause of Action, Rock Products 
incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation 
contained in paragraphs 1 through and including 3 0 above. 
32. Sometime in September of 1986, Widerberg, the 
president of Richards, conspired with Lin, a representative 
of the Division and agent of Richards, to defraud Rock 
Products in the following manner: 
a. It was agreed between them that the inspector 
provided by the Division would be removed from the job site 
during the remaining period of construction under the 
Richards Contract to deprive Rock Products of a 
representative to sign for the remaining sand. 
b. It was further agreed that Rock Products should be 
induced to install such sand, but that, after the 
installation of such sand, the Division and Richards would 
refuse to pay for the same claiming that they had no 
obligation to do so because of a lack of signature on the 
part of an inspector. 
33. In furtherance of that agreement, the inspector was 
removed from the job, and Widerberg requested, on or about 
October 10, 1986, by speed letter, that the sand be installed 
by Rock Products. 
34. In reliance upon said letter and due to the 
circumstances and pressures regarding completion of the System, 
Rock Products installed approximately $34,000.00 worth of 
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additional sand; had Rock Products been aware that Widerberg 
and Lin had no intention of causing the Division and Richards 
to pay for such sand, Rock Products would not have installed 
the same. Rock Products has not been paid for such 
additional sand despite demand for payment having been made 
upon Lin and Widerberg. 
35. It was the intention of Lin and Wideberg that Rock 
Products be induced, through the circumstances and pressures 
regarding completion of the System, and it was the intention of 
Widerberg that Rock Products rely upon the representations 
contained in said letter, to install the sand, but that Rock 
Products not be paid for such sand. 
36. Rock Products has, therefore, been defrauded in the 
amount of approximately $34,000.00, which sum has not yet been 
paid, together with interest thereon at the rate of 13.5% per 
annum from the due date thereof until the $34,000.00 is paid in 
full. 
37. Because of such conspiracy and scheme to defraud, Rock 
Products is entitled to punitive damages against Lin and 
Widerberg in the amount of $100,000.00 each. 
WHEREFORE, Rock Products prays as to its First Cause of 
Action as follows: 
A. For damages against Lin and Widerberg, and each of 
them, in the amount of approximately $34,000.00, plus interest 
thereon at the rate of 13.5% per annum as alleged above. 
B. For punitive damages against Lin and Widerberg, and 
each of them, in the amount of $100,000.00. 
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C. For attorney's fees and costs in pursuing this action. 
D. For such other and further relief as the court shall 
deem appropriate. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Intentional Misrepresentation) 
(Widerberg) 
38. Rock Products incorporates herein by reference each 
and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through and 
including 30 above. 
39. Widerberg made untrue representations to Rock Products 
that Richards intended to pay for approximately $34,000.00 
worth of additional sand with respect to the System to be 
installed after inspectors were withdrawn from the System job 
site in October of 1986. Such representations were untrue and 
were known by Widerberg to be untrue at the time they were made. 
40. In reliance upon such representations, Rock Products 
installed approximately $34,000.00 worth of additional sand 
with respect to installation of the System and Rock Products 
has not been paid for the same despite demand for payment upon 
Lin and Widerberg. 
41. Had Rock Products been aware that Widerberg had no 
intention of Richards paying for such sand, Rock Products would 
not have installed the additional sand. 
42. As a proximate cause of such misrepresentations, Rock 
Products has sustained damages in the amount of approximatley 
$34,000.00 for such additional sand, together with interest 
thereon at the rate of 13.5% per annum from the due date 
thereof until the entire $34,000.00 is paid in full. 
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43. As a result of such misrepresentations, Rock Products 
is entitled to punitive damages against Widerberg in the amount 
of $100,000.00. 
WHEREFORE, Rock Products prays as to its Second Cause of 
Action as follows: 
A. For judgment against Widerberg in the amount of 
approximately $34,000.00, together with interest thereon from 
the date the same was due at the rate 13.5% per annum until the 
same is fully paid. 
B. For judgment against Widerberg for punitive damages in 
the amount of $100,000. 
C. For attorney's fees and costs in pursuing this action. 
D. For such other and further relief as to the court 
shall deem appropriate. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligent Misrepresentation) 
(Lin and Widerberg) 
44. Rock Products incorporates herein by reference each 
and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through and 
including 3 0 above. 
45. Lin and Widerberg, and each of them, knew or should 
have known that the soil conditions of the Properties were not 
as represented in the Pre-Bid Conference, in the 
Pre-Construction Conference, and in the Specifications, and Lin 
and Widergerg were negligent in misrepresenting the same. 
46. Rock Products relied upon such representations in 
entering into and performing work under the Richards Contract. 
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47. As a result of such misrepresentations, Rock Products 
has incurred costs of approximately $116,000.00 that were not 
anticipated under the original bid, and Rock Products is 
entitled to payment for the same. 
48. Rock Products is entitled to interest thereon at the 
rate of 13.5% per annum from the date of incurring such costs 
until the same are fully paid. 
49. In addition, Widerberg knew or should have known that 
Richards could not obtain the construction permit at no charge, 
and Widerberg was negligent in representing that the permit 
would be obtained at no charge. 
50. Rock Products relied upon such representations in 
entering into and performing work under the Richards Contract. 
WHEREFORE, Rock Products prays as to its Third Cause of 
Action as follows: 
A. For judgment against Lin and Widerberg, and each of 
them, in the amount of $116,000.00, plus interest thereon as 
alleged. 
B. For judgment against Widerberg in the amount of $3,900 
for such permit, plus interest thereon at the rate of 13.5% 
from the date of payment for the permit by Rock Products until 
Rock Products is fully reimbursed for the $3,900.00. 
C. For judgment against Lin and Widerberg, and each of 
them, for additional damages of not less than $100,000.00 in 
accordance with proof to be presented at the time of trial as a 
result of Rock Products' inability to obtain bonding. 
D. For judgment against Lin and Widerberg, and each of 
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deem appropriate. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF AC1!1 ION 
(Conspiracy to Convert Property) 
(Lin and Widerberg) 
51 • R i)ck Pi: o Illc tis i ncorporates her e 1 n 1:::)y reference each 
and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through and 
including above. 
52. 
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G. For attorne s lees ana cost. isuitvfi this rirr inn 
H. I .: ?.r and furthpr reiier s the court S I M I ! 
deem appropriate. 
Ji *i 
F I F T H C A U S E 0 F A C T I 0 N 
(Breach of Contract) 
(The Division) 
57. Rock Products incorporates herein by reference each 
and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through and 
i ncj ud ing 2M a hi v/e. 
58. Pursuant to the Di vision Contract, the Division had 
the responsibility for, among other things, the engineering, 
lay-out, iinul configuration J - ,-^ uem anu, ±u ui; • •••-<.-:, 
had d iiILI ! y I 11 Rock Pi: oduc : 
a. Properly investigate the soil conditions of the 
System and properly represent the conditions of the soil 
; Proper^: the System along rights-of--ay 
and timely obtain clearance of rights-of-way. 
< Maintain v inspector r a** . . times to 
: * - • • . w a s 
properly performed with respect to the System. 
Rock Products is a third-party beneficiary under the Division 
Contract,. 
59. "The Division breached its duty to Rock Products as 
follows 
c failed * properly investigate ' • * 
co* * * * 1 J t 11urns 
of z , . . '.• aspects c: * .-* project -\ *• ,ng the 
System. 
0 1 
b. It" J a t J nd to properly lay out the System along 
rights-of-way and failed to timely obtain clearance of 
rights-of-way. 
- * - j r L a i n -in i j i s p e i i t, r MINI t h e i o t t o 
sign - r -^:; -i - required and make certain that work was 
properly performed, with respect to installation o*. cue 
System. 
60. As a direct and proximate result of such breach, Rock 
Products incurred the additional costs and expenses alleged 
above. 
WHEPEFORE, Ruck Products prays as to its Fifth Cause of 
Action as fo11owsi 
A. For judgment against the Division in the amount of 
^ I i n 1 H h i I 11 il 11 i 111 e I t>b 1 ci ii I I ei|*-fJ 11 H J v t - ; , 
B. For judgment against the Division for damages, due to 
Rock Products1 inability tc obtain bondinc amount to be 
established accordance wit ?dl a t t I! i 
C. For judgment against the Division for damage to the 
business reputation and business relations of Rock Products 
fju» .^mivini tii hn Pi.'tabJ IHIICLI I N ai/cui d i nc*1 dii.h p r o o t t o b e 
presented . i t the 11 me o f 11* i a ] . 
D. For attorney's fees and costs in pursuing this action. 
E. For such other and further relief is the* VIMI* GhalL 
deem appi; upi idt.e. 
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:A 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Failure to Fund) 
(The Division) 
61. Rock Products incorporates herein by reference each 
and every al legation contained in paragraphs L through and 
I n c 1 u d i n g 3 0 a b o v e. 
62. Due to such failure to pay said 85% -f '' - urchase 
price ..;' the Richards contract, * ru:- Division ;s indebted to 
> :• " " ' • I li'i I , lit t • .,. ; a s t 
thereon alleged , paragraph -i -
WHEREFORE, Rock Products prays ^ 3 .t..> Sixth Cause of 
Acti 
A. for judgment against the Division in the amount of 
$45,091.33, plus interest as alleged above. 
B. For attorney's fees and costs ursuing this action. 
C . I1111 ,:, i j i; 11 i -11 11 e i ri r 11II I n j; 1 1 1 e i t > f. J i h c u 111 I s 11 a 1 1 
deem appropriate. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Interference With Prospective Econom I c Relations) 
(Palmer) 
6 3• Rock Products incorporates herein hy reference each 
e ' . i I i hi t utj'i|h r ind 
including above. 
64. On __ .... :; .- November . . Palmer wrote a letter 
Products Bergener requesting that 
Rock Products resolve - disputes .ay have wi th Richards 
and that, until such disputes were settled, Rock Products was 
"removed from our pre-qualified potential contractor list." As 
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a result, Rock Products has been since barred from bidding ^ 
any work to be perforined for or in connection with the : /ision. 
h":i , ,liucn ,1 er„iiei" .11ini,I, siJ("I'in r»ii'11n11 i o t n i a ii y dm * * \ . . 
i n t e r f e r r e d w i t h R o c k P r o d u c t s ' e x i s t i n g a n d p o t * . --*• r ~ : c 
relations in being able to bid upon and obtain centra*:" t 
sueh worl hheiehy earn mi] i m u r y to Rock 1'roduc^? ~ «r ^ n t 
to Le pi nven 'it the ( HUH* ut I i ot 1 , bull ill mi ewe 
$100,000,00. 
hh Such conduct was employed for the purpose of forcing a 
i. esu i ut i i mi i 111 in 111 .split e L>*- I a I" e pa r •: i es r -it he i t I i n 11 
furthering any legitimate governmental goa.1 or purpose, and, 
therefore was instituted for an improper purpose. 
in1 In writinq such letter and undertaking such 3 - . • • -
lJ a l i n e r a c 1.e 1J w 1 1 II1 ni n 1 J 1 H I 11 1111 e r 11.11, JIII «111.1 y 
injury upon Rock Products tu roerce Rock rroduct, •. * -• : ~^~ 
a settlement which was neither *»j its advantage ;._^  .ti.rantid, 
.ere: ,;- Palme: , .,debted to Rock Products \n the 
amou;1 the damages • illeged in paragraph 6 5 above, 
t :-*•"• «=• * i - - amaaes «,' imou' >i of $100, r rin 0 0 . 
-:;.-.- . I i, 1 111 1 ! ,1 e v e n t h 1 ,„" n 11 s r o f 
Action as foi,:-
h I1 • j u d g m e n t a g a ; ; -*. ?*;??*- t h e amount iamages 
t o LH, e,i 1 1 * - - : -"f ~i* t*-d a t 
t h e t iTTie r fc : - . 
M. IKor punitive damages against Palmer in the amount of 
$ I 0 in ,„ 1 i n . 
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C. For attorney's fees and costs In bringing this action. 
D. inr -Mil I ' .:er and further relief as the Court shall 
deer, app: cpr lat e , 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Interference With Prospective Economic Relations) 
(Division) 
69. Rock Products Incorporates herein by reference each 
iinl f>"ei • UJi?«]il I in " • rit u n m l in | . i r i q r \ * p h i 1 t h i o u q h and 
i n c l u d i n g 30 a b o v e . 
'mi iin or abou t Novembe- , '" ~; . ' \ . " w :^ ;h 
Pa I rn e r , w ? •n t e a I P. f t e r t o F ock Prodi: - * ^ r ? ** * Bryan 
Fiercjenet i eqm-.-st j up l.li J I l« 
may have wi th (Richards and t u a t , u n t i l such d i s p u t e s were 
s e t t l e d , Rock P r o d u c t s was "removed from our p r e - q u a l i f i e d 
|.i t e n t i tin i on! i n i m i i st > n m i" unit, i "ink Produc t i h-iu 
s i n c e been b a r r e d from b i d d i n g un .iiiy wui k I i hv pei tornini i I 
o r in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e D i v i s i o n , 
Ml "iijrh l e t t e r .ml such a c t i o n . a c t u a l l y anil p o t e n t i a l l y 
i n t e i Lei i uui W I li lli lh n k innnlin f -i' ex i »1 i ncj in I (jnturit i a I FM oniumLn 
r e l a t i o n s in b e i n g a b l e fn liid upon and o b t a i n c o n t r a c t s f o r 
such work, t h e r e b y c a u s i n g i n j u r y t o Rock P r o d u c t s in nn amuunt 
t I P PI; (• lb ] j she | IN l e c o r d a n n p wiHi nroof t o be p r e s e n t e d a t 
t h e t i m e of; t r i a l , In* in ^ i.^'upi 11
 b U M > ;I i m , li i m 
"\" , Such conduc t was employed fu r t h e p u r p o s e of f o r c i n g a 
r e s o l u t i o n of a d i s p u t e be tween p r i v a t e p a r t i e s r a t h e r t h a n 
1 a. Miei J i< i .in ,( ir-tpt hfnatiu «) ivpffirai'ii'i I qu > ' "i f.\ir\ i>se and 
t h e r e f o r e was i n s t i t u t e d for' an improper p u r p o s e , 
- 2 7 -
73, In writing such letter and undertaking such activity, 
t f1P n T y T [S ] un ( t h rouqh Pa lmnr , acted w l th ma 1 ice to 
i n t e n 1 1 o r i t;i J. 1 y i n t 1. i \' t' e i 1i111» J 1111: m 11 | n 11 , 1111 R111 *. k P r n 11 u c* t J:, I 11 
coerce Rock Products to entet into a settlement which was 
neither t;n its advantage not: warranted and, therefore, 
i Mjist.jtul M.B iinpiupei n iiin;iiin",t», 
"'4. Therefore, the Division is indebted to Rock Products 
in the amount »)): the damages alleged in paragraph 7 1 above, 
t oget her w i tlh | nm i 11 ve damaqes i n t hp. amount of $500 , rnif) , Oh , 
1 K
 I IT a t U i e U l V l s i o i ' i M i SU rt" I J'n.J Wrt! 11 M l V ' J J V ' : " I I "I M l 1 
exercise of any governmental function. 
WHEREFORE, Rock Product prays as to its Eighth Cause of 
r judgment against the Div ision in the amount 
damages tc - -" -; lished in accordance wi th proof to be 
pre*-*-- at the txme of trial, but in no event less than 
$. . 
For punitive damages against the Division i n the 
amo v^ n L O f $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 - 0 0 . 
C. (''""•'Hi' ifi I" t; urne^, ' "•« f e e s cifin.l cii '- it •., i n b r i n g i n g t;h:i s a c t i o n . 
ill/'or such o t h e r and fur ther relief"' a s t h e Coin: t; iihlb.-t I I 
deem app r ;p r I a t e , 
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(T'ot t j i,;ii,:. 1 lit erfe^-r.'e with ;. '--"irMj.il Pe 1 at 11 *i:M 
Palmer 
nh ! i x i ; - * • - i nil i ly r e f err? ni np »j"i" h 
and every alle--*. . :ontained in pa:agraphs I through ami 
including 3 0 above• 
-28-
n 7 . Cn or about November 14, 198f, Palmer wrote g letter 
ick Products in care of Mr, Bryan Bergener requesting 
hoik i-iuiuctn Misnl"i» HIT/ d I sf nt * n it niay have wi t h 
Richards and that, until such disputes were settled i-« irr 
Products was "removed from our pre-guii 1 if ied potential 
\:ntract,c \ lis1 " n, ri result, RocF rrodu "t:s has since been 
barred from biddjnq on dii/ <«i il l i In | ei 1
 k nued lor mi in 
connection with the Division 
78, li'ni writing suen letter and undertaking such activity; 
Palmer ac'led w 11 li ma I i r i I m nl L nt i HI i J i
 jf i nf I i nf ei on 'in i 
injury on Rock Products to coerce Rock Products t.u entci uit.o a 
settlement which was neither to its advantage noi warranted. 
' i'i . ,tl cut LL^ J. < 'J,1 of Dficembfi*, 1 9 " ^ Hadfield 
Irrigation Company was successiui in nia j in i ny i lie I nil null 
contract work it Install a 1^ Inch pressure irrigation line at 
Henifer„ Utah 
'in I ut .jU.iiit hi tinqui i JI I inns IhH ween Hock Products and 
Hadiield, Hidfield indicated that J I; wishei Rock Prudu:U- to 
undertake a portion of the construction of sucti line at a total 
contract n r u p tn Pnnk Productr of approximately $5?,nnn nn 
i in I" i Nil \M • i , Hcnil j *;» 111 inn,) ihfnmicj by Cirtry *ic\.\h.\ , !i"i 
emp1oyee o f the DIvis i onr tiI at he had been inf orTOed b) Pa Imer 
teat no work wa^ * ; e subcontracted to Rock Products by 
j - - - . i therefore refused to utilize Rock 
Products ,,.. * . r, * . ect. 
- : : z.\:tf on behal f of the Palmer, therefore, 
c K rxoducts of its right to contract with 
-29-
Hadfield in regard to such wnrTc irid tortiously interferred 
with Rock Produces" contractual relations with Hadfield. 
83. l« JI i. . ,* PI* l ^ t ern.v * * i by " <pp! >per «pear r:, for "<n 
improper purpose, and caused injury to R O C K Products mi n m 
amount of approximately $5,!, n00, 00, 
•i i it-- i11 i/ iu ii .rondurf , |^  Products is entitled 
*-~ recover said damages, jjlui jniten1! thei^on 11 the ! Hi- il 
10% per annum iron the date the $52,000,00 would have Leen paid 
by HddfiuiJ until cue same is fully p.iid tn Rock Product--, 
f ogether w i ! h | nn j I i >H danianns Hiffii i nsl Pa 1 mi?r > !" amoun* - •' 
$ion,ooo,no, 
WHEREFORE, Rock Product prays as to its Ninth Cause of 
An t K m i • 1 11 1 'vi: 
A } or judgment against Palmet i n t:ln aniL Jim il" daiimges 
to be established in accordance with proof to be presented at 
the tim T trial, but in no event less than $52,000.00, plus 
inter, es 
P " -4 * damages a ^ a . ; r Palmur in t h e .1111 Mini I 
$10 0 , " ^ 
I ,'i I- f oi"ney ' s f e e s and cos t «"•; i n br I ng i ng t h i s a c t i o n . 
11. : o r such o t h e r rind Lai Ihei, .• I i e 1" a„;,i tho Coin, t: sha I I 
deem appropriate, 
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(T ortious Inter ferein le with Contractual Relations) 
(Division) 
nrporates herein by reference each 
and every a. ^ ./ in e a 111 \ \ a 1 a q 1 a fi 111 ,s 1 t 1 n r 11 u 1 ^  11 . 1 111:11 
including . , r • . paragraphs <?"7 through and 
- 3 0-
including 83 above, 
86. In engaging In such conduct, Palmer and Cooper were 
a c 11 n q o n n e n a i t n r fnn In v i s i i) r i, v i u I ' 1 I 1 • in f" I' i R i r 
personal capacities, and the Division is, i: n ere. tore, Liable 
for such damages as alleged in paragraph 83 above, plus 
interest tlherenn vt the r-itp of 10"! por annum from the rlrite 
Hadf ,ie 1 ell 'w u 111 11Ltvt.j 1 1 a Ii.1 a.i 111 ;J" <(, 11nini 1111 11111 i I I 111» tnimti i s 
fully paid to Rock Products, together with punitive damaqes in 
the amount of $500, C* 
WHERFFORF, Rnck fir ays is I n if •• !Y;nl Hi C n.i<si- nf 
A c t i o n a s fo1Lows: 
A l« or judgment a g a i n s t t h e D i v i s i o n in t h e amount of 
damaqes hi bo e s t a b l i s h e d in nccorc lanre w i t h p roo f t o hp 
p r e s e n t c i l \\ t In I inn nil I i i il bull iiii nu i > mil l o s s tllinii 
$ 5 2 , 0 0 0 . tin p l u s i n t e r e s t ; t h e r e o n a s a l l e g e d . 
t i v e damages a g a i n s t t h e D i v i s i o n i n t h e 
i , .* -c '*°es and cost, , , in I r i n g i n g t h i s a c t i o n . 
"or s u e .:•**' i~J f u r t h e r r e l i e f as t h e Cour t s h a l l 
deem a p p r o p r i a t e . 
ELEVENTH CAUSE Ob ACTION 
( I n j u n c t i v e R e l i e f - D i v i s i o n and Pa lmer) 
- - Uroducts i n c o r p o r a t e s h e r e i n by r e f e r e n c e e a c h 
and • "-• l e g a t i o n c o n t a i n e d in p a r ' g r a p h s 1 t h r o u g h ai id 
i n c l u d e . iijvtj tilliJ in p a r a g r a p h s ni thinnugli iiiu.l 
i n c l u d i n • a b o v e . 
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88. Such conduct has and will result in permanent and 
.Irreparable harm 'to ROK:!'; Products by i rreparably damaging 
its relations with contract.or s and supip 1 ler s ,„ daniacj .11 iq Hoi • Ik; 
Products reputation In the community, and irreparably causing 
damage II "he business of Rock. Products, 
8 9 . > i. i k 1:" it. i.. 11 i 111.: I s i. '• 1 1 11 e r e f o r e i •». n 1 1 1 ' 1. e d I i | e i • m a r i e n t, 
injunction against the Division, Palmer, and Its personnel to 
cease and desist from such interference and prohibition of Rock 
P r o d i i c t "|! '"',i« r i ">]!i 1 f o lb i ell nipt m iim.'l pa r t u i p a t i-» i ni ID i v i s i on m l a t e d 
p r o j e c t s 
WHEREFORE, Rock Products prays a s to I ts Eleventh Cause of 
Action as follows: 
A . I? :::)i: 1 [ 11« n u . i 11 e 111 111 111 n t f I o 11 \ \ \ \ 111 s I I II11 111 v i s 11 11, 
against Palmer and against all other appropriate personnel of 
the Divisj on to cease and desist from such Interference and 
pi: oh i bit i c n 
B. I 'or attorney's fees and costs in pursuing this action. 
C For such other and further relief as the Court shall 
deem appropriate. 
TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Good Faith Di i tyj 
(Division.) 
Q n
 °- ** incorporates herein by raterence each 
and -vc* *. . ec.v: i on tained i n paragraphs 1 through and 
i " .i1 v r >ha in paragraphs 51 through and 
inc„ 
'he Div:s; ^  has an ob] igation and duty to ict A.~ ~~~^ 
fairh *A w.Ac pcriormance of the Division Contract, 
-3 2-
" ; i 
92. The Division has breached its duty of good faith wi th 
respect to the Division Contract by engaging in the above 
al 1 eged I iiipropei cunducl The I'vjv i "iinin tin - - * s 
duty of good faith In thdt „ alter commencement * - . 
installation of the System, Lin and Widerberg requests: 
save timn thir x wcv Products initiate chanqe orders rather 
t h a n R i c h a r d s i n 11 int i u<j Ilium Uui k l i u d u t s coiiipl i n« I *H Mi III 
r e q u e s t , -mid W i d e r b e r g , on b e h a l f of R i c h a r d s ami Lin on b e h a l f 
of t h e D i v i s i o n , nnw c l a i m t h e y have no du ty t o pay f o r rharige 
o r d e r s in it Ml ml h, h I I n M u c i ' s I»ei nine I J nhai tin ill nil mil 
i n i t i a t e ("heir 
7 1 , T h e r e f o r e , Rock P r o d u c t s i s e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r n o t 
o n l y t h e damages an a l l e g e d above, hul a l s o p u n i t i v e damaqes 
a g a i list I In- Hi i. -. n HI I in I I in inn inn I i Ul *\\\\\\ nnn nn . 
WHEREFORE, Rock P r o d u c t s p r a y s a s t u i t s T w e l f t h Cause of 
A c t i o n as fo l1ows• 
\ II f i f | in i d i p i n e n t d q a i n i I t II i n II 11 m n i 111 m m 11 II II m i m mil111 m i m t i » t 
$13fn,, J8i.ii , inh. , 
H. For interest on said $130 „ 386. 86 through and including 
April "in, 1987, in the amount o£ $7,912.19. 
I I i int. e r e .si: in nn ini $137), i l l i . b h il'moni Ap r ] I 'in I n " „ 
until said $130,386,66 is fully paid at the rate of $48.*!2 per 
day. 
* le Divisi * * damacres to be 
estaDiisne accoraance 
time . *" * : - no event less than $100 
-3 3-
E. For damage to its business reputation in an amount to 
be established in accordance with proof to be presented at the 
time of trial. 
F. For punitive damages against the Division in the 
amount of $500,000.00. 
G. For attorney's fees and costs in pursuing this action. 
H. For such other and further relief as the Court shall 
deem appropriate. 
THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Violation of State Constitutional Rights 
Guaranteed Under Article 12, Section 19 of 
Utah Constitution) 
(The Division and Palmer) 
94. Rock Products incorporates herein by reference each 
and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through and 
including 37 and in paragraphs 51 through and including 89 
above. 
95. Article 12, Section 19 of the Utah Constitution 
states: 
Every person in this State shall be free to obtain 
employment whenever possible, and any person, 
corporation, or agent, servant or employer thereof, 
maliciously interfering or hindering in any way, any 
person from obtaining or enjoying employment already 
obtained, from any other corporation or person, shall 
be deemed guilty of a crime. The Legislature shall 
provide by law for the enforcement of this section. 
The purpose of the aforementioned provision of the Utah 
Constitution was to prohibit the exact interference with 
contractual relations by the Division and Palmer as set forth 
above. 
96. A private right of action against the Division and 
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Palmer, separate from any claim for tortious interference, 
exists in favor of Rock Products, rendering Palmer and the 
Division liable for the damages set forth above, together 
with punitive damages in the amount of $100,000.00 against 
Palmer and $500,000.00 against the Division. 
WHEREFORE, Rock Products prays as to its Thirteenth Cause 
of Action as follows: 
A. For judgment against the Division for damages to be 
established in accordance with proof to be presented at the 
time of trial, but in no event less than $100,000.00 for damage 
to the business reputation and business relations of Rock 
Products in an amount to be established in accordance with 
proof to be presented at the time of trial. 
B. For punitive damages against Palmer in the amount of 
$100,000.00 and against the Division in the amount of 
$500,000.00. 
C. For attorney's fees and costs in pursuing this action. 
D. For such other and further relief as the Court shall 
deem appropriate. 
FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Mechanic's Lien Foreclosure) 
97. Rock Products incorporates herein by reference each 
and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through and 
including 3 0 above. 
98. Said mechanic's Lien was filed pursuant to authority 
under Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-1 and sequential. 
99. As set forth in said Lien, Rock Products claims a 
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mechanic's lien in the amount and with respect to the 
Properties owned by the Property Owners as is more particularly 
set forth in said Lien. 
100. Notices of said Lien, including amendments, were sent 
to the reputed owners or record owners of the Properties via 
certified mail within thirty (30) days after filing of the 
notice of said lien and within thirty (30) days after filing 
any amendments thereto. 
101. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-15, 
Rock Products is entitled to a decree from this Court causing 
the Properties to be sold in satisfaction of the Lien and to 
pay costs as in the case of foreclosure of mortgages subject to 
the right of redemption and, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 38-1-16, Rock Products is entitled to obtain a 
deficiency judgment against the Property Owners in the amount 
of the sums due and owing to Rock Products not paid and 
satisfied pursuant to such sale. Rock Products is therefore 
entitled to recover all of its attorney's fees and costs in 
pursuing this action. 
102. Does I through and including XXX claim some right, 
title or interest in and to all or some of the Properties; 
however any such right, title or interest is subordinate and 
inferior to the Lien rights of Rock Products in and to the 
Properties. The identity, address, and nature of claimed 
right, title or interest, of Does I through and including XXX 
are presently unknown to Rock Products, and Rock Products 
reserves the right to amend this Amended Third-Party Complaint 
-36-
if and when such information is obtained by Rock Products. 
WHEREFORE, Rock Products prays as to its Fourteenth Cause 
of Action as follows: 
A. For judgment against the Property Owners for all 
outstanding indebtedness under the Richards Contract, including 
costs, attorney's fees and interest. 
B. That the Properties be sold, free and clear of all 
rights, titles and interests of the third-party defendants, 
under the direction of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, 
pursuant to a decree of foreclosure entered by this Court, with 
the proceeds to be applied to the outstanding balance under the 
Richards Contract and with Rock Products being granted a 
judgment against the Property Owners for any deficiency which 
may remain. 
C. That Rock Products or any other party to this action 
may become a purchaser of said Properties at sheriff's sale; 
that the sheriff issue a certificate of sale of the purchase of 
said Properties and that the sheriff issue his deeds to the 
purchaser or purchasers thereof conveying said Properties; that 
a writ of possession be issued by the Clerk of this Court upon 
presentation of such sheriff's deed without further order of 
this Court. 
D. That all the foregoing be done in accordance with the 
laws of the State of Utah regarding the foreclosure of 
mechanic's liens and, consequently, the foreclosure of 
mortgages. 
-37-
E. For such other and further relief as the Court shall 
deem appropriate. 
FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Civil Action for Violation of 
Constitutionally Protected Rights) 
(Lin and Palmer) 
103. Rock Products incorporates herein by reference each 
and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through and 
including 37 above and in paragraphs 51 through and including 
89 above. 
104. At all times mentioned above, Lin and Palmer were 
acting under color of Utah State law. 
105. As alleged above, Lin and Palmer were acting as 
employees, agents and representatives of the Division at all 
times mentioned above. 
106. In intentionally entering into a scheme and conspiracy 
to defraud Rock Products of said $34,000 worth of funds 
associated with the installation of sand after the withdrawal 
of the inspector, Lin 1) acted with malice and/or intentional 
indifference and/or with reckless disregard of the 
constitutional rights of Rock Products as guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
2) deprived Rock Products of a property interest without due 
process of law in violation of that provision, and 3) is liable 
to Rock Products pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for 
damages it has sustained due to such violations. 
107. By engaging in the conduct to exclude Rock Products 
from the Division's pre-qualified contractors list, which 
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amounted to "black balling" Rock Products from participating in 
Division related contracts and bidding, including, but not 
limited to, the Hadfield Project, Palmer did, with gross 
negligence and/or wanton negligence and/or reckless disregard 
of the constitutional rights of Rock Products as guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, violate that constitutional provision: 
a. By depriving Rock Products of its property rights 
with respect to such contracts and economic gain without 
due process of law; and 
b. By unreasonably and arbitrarily discriminating 
against Rock Products in violation of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Consequently, Palmer is liable to Rock Products pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for the damages it has sustained due 
to such violation. 
108. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988, Rock Products is 
entitled to recover, in addition to the damages it has 
sustained as a result of the foregoing conduct on the part of 
Lin and Palmer, all reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in pursuing this action. 
109. As a result of such conduct by Lin, Rock Products has 
sustained damages in the amount of $34,000.00, plus interest as 
alleged above. 
110. As a result of such conduct by Palmer, Rock Products 
has incurred direct and proximate damages in accordance with 
proof to be presented at the time of trial, but in no event 
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less than $152,000.00. 
111. In addition, Rock Products is entitled to punitive 
damages against Lin and Palmer, and each of them, due to such 
Oconstitutional violation in the amount of $100,000.00. 
WHEREFORE, Rock Products prays as to its Fifteenth Cause of 
Action as follows: 
A. For judgment against Lin in the amount of $34,000.00, 
plus interest as alleged above. 
B. For judgment against Palmer in the amount of damages 
to be established in accordance with proof to be presented at 
the time of trial, but in no event to be less than $152,000.00, 
together with interest thereon as alleged above. 
B. For punitive damages against Lin in the amount of 
$100,000.00 
C For punitive damages against Palmer in the amount of 
$100,000.00. 
D. For attorney's fees and costs in bringing this action. 
E. For such other and further relief as the Court shall 
deem appropriate. 
Dated this S day of August, 1987. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
BY (K ^XJXk 7)j(jL^ 
P. KEITH NELSON 
Attorneys for Third-Party 
Plaintiff, VES A. KARREN 
dba ROCK PRODUCTS COMPANY 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this day of August, 1987, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
-40-
be deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
James E. Morton, Esq. 
Hatch, Morton & Skeen 
3450 Highland Drive, #150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
AM/THIRD/ROCK 
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DALLIN W. JENSEN, No. 1669 
Solicitor General 
R. DOUGLAS CREDILLE, No. 752 
Assistant Attorney General 
ATTORNEYS FOR STATE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS 
1636 West North Temple, Suite 300 
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Telephone; (801) 538-7227 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS 
CO., and INTEGON INDEMNITY CORP., 
Defendants. 
VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS 
COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., 
DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, 
PETER T. LIN, W. JAMES PALMER, 
et al., 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C87-2390 
Judge David S. Young 
Third-Party Defendants. 
On January 25, 1988, pursuant to notice, the Court conducted 
a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss filed in this case by Third-
Party Defendants Utah Division of Water Resources, W. James Palm-
er, and Peter T. Lin ("State Defendants"). 
1. Having carefully considered the pleadings, the memoranda 
and cases submitted, and the arguments of counsel, and being ful-
ly advised in the premises, the Court finds and holds that as a 
matter of law Rock Products1 Amended Third-Party Complaint fails 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against the 
State Defendants. 
2. The Court concludes that the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, Section 63-30-1 et seq. (U.C.A. 1953), bars every aspect of 
Rock Products1 Amended Third-Party Complaint against the State 
Defendants. The State Defendants1 involvement in this case con-
stituted a governmental function, and there has been no relevant, 
applicable waiver of immunity that would permit Rock Products to 
maintain a cause of action against the State Defendants. Rock 
Products' Amended Third-Party Complaint also fails to state a 
claim for reasons of law independent of sovereign immunity. 
3. Rock Products has no contract with the State and is not 
the intended beneficiary of a State contract, and therefore can-
not maintain its contract claims. Also, since the State Defen-
dants have no contractual obligation toward Rock Products, the 
Section 63-30-5 waiver of immunity for contracts does not apply, 
and Rock Products' contract claims are barred. 
4. Rock Products' tort claims do not state a cause of ac-
tion, and are also barred by immunity. Sections 63-30-3; 63-30-
4; and 63-30-10. 
5. Rock Products' constitutional and statutory and civil 
rights claims fail because of sovereign immunity; and because 
Rock Products has failed to state a claim; and because, on the 
alleged facts, Rock Products cannot state a claim under the State 
or federal statutes or the Utah Constitution or the United States 
Constitution. 
6. As to the fifteenth cause of action, Rock Products has 
failed to comply with the notice requirements of Sections 63-30-
11 and -12. The statutory time for compliance and for filing 
additional claims has now expired. 
7. Rock Products has failed to comply with the bond require-
ment of Section 63-30-19. 
Having concluded as a matter of law that Rock Products' Amen-
ded Third-Party Complaint does not and cannot state a cause of 
action against the State Defendants, and because Rock Products' 
claims are barred by sovereign immunity, 
THE COURT THEREFORE ORDERS: 
The State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted. 
Rock Products' Amended Third-Party Complaint is dismissed with 
prejudice, for the reasons set forth in paragraphs 1-6. 
THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
Judgment is hereby entered against Third-Party Plaintiff Rock 
Products and in favor of Third-Party Defendants Utah Division of 
Water Resources, W. James Palmer, and Peter T. Lin (the State 
Defendants). 
•s5 DATED this JJ-^day of/Pj^&f^, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID S. Y0UNGI 
D i s t r i c t / C o u r l Judge 
By QL-PGJL 
C«*v^V Ci&k 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the forego-
ing proposed ORDER AND JUDGMENT were served by mailing the same, 
first class postage prepaid, this ^ f Vday of March, 1988, to: 
P. Keith Nelson 
David L. Barclay 
Gary L. Johnson 
Attorneys for Third-Party Plaintiffs Karren 
and Rock Products 
50 South Main Street, #700 
P.O. Box 2465 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110 
A^S CREDILLE 
Assistant Attorney General 
ADDENDUM C 
52 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — 
Equal protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
zens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 19. [Blacklisting forbidden.! 
Every person in this State shall be free to obtain 
employment whenever possible, and any person, cor-
poration, or agent, servant or employee thereof, mali-
ciously interfering or hindering in any way, any per-
son from obtaining or enjoying employment already 
obtained, from any other corporation or person, shall 
be deemed guilty of a crime. The Legislature shall 
provide by law for the enforcement of this section. 
1896 
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Section 1983 providt follows: 
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in 
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress 
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be 
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia." 
42 USC § 1983 
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63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities 
from suit 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chap-
ter, all governmental entities are immune from suit 
for any injury which results from the exercise of a 
governmental function, governmentally-owned hospi-
tal, nursing home, or other governmental health care 
facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or 
other professional health care clinical training pro-
gram conducted in either public or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation 
of flood and storm systems by governmental entities 
are considered to be governmental functions, and gov-
ernmental entities and their officers and employees 
are immune from suit for any injury or damage re-
sulting from those activities. 1985 
63-30-4 Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability -
Effect of waiver of immunity - Exclusive remedy - Joinder of 
employee - Limitations on personal liability. 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a 
governmental entity in a representative capacity if the act or 
omission complained of is one for which the governmental 
entity may be liable, but no employee may be held personally 
liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance 
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment or 
under color of authority, unless it is established that the 
employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice. 
63-30-5 Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligations. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any 
contractual obligation. Actions arising out of contractual rights or 
obligations shall not be subject to the requirements of Section 63-30-
11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19. 
63-30-10 Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission 
of employee - Exceptions - Waiver for injury caused by violation 
of fourth amendment rights. 
(1) Immunity from suit oj all governmental entities is waived jor 
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of employment except if 
the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure 
to exercise or perform a discretionary junction, whether 
or not the discretion is abused; or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false 
arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, 
abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference 
with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or 
civil rights; or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or by 
reason of making an inadequate or negligent inspection 
of any property; or 
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee 
whether or not it is negligent or intemional; or . . . 
63-30-11. Claim for injury - Notice - Contents - Service - Legal disability. 
(1) A claim is deemed to arise when the statute of limitations that 
would apply if the claim were against a private person 
commences to run. 
ADDENDUM G 
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68-3-3 Retroactive effect. 
No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so 
declared. 
* * * 
68-3-4 Civil and criminal remedies not merged. 
When the violation of a right admits of both a civil and criminal 
remedy, the right to prosecute the one is not merged in the other. 
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34-24-1 Blacklisting of employees prohibited. 
No person shall blacklist or publish, or cause to be published or 
blacklisted, any employee discharged or voluntarily leaving the 
service of any person, company or corporation with intent and for 
the purpose of preventing such employee from engaging in or 
securing similar or other employment from any other person, 
company or corporation. 
* * * 
34-24-2 Violation - Penalty. 
If any person blacklists or publishes, or causes to be blacklisted or 
published, any employee discharged by any corporation, company 
or individual, with the intent and for the purpose of preventing such 
employee from engaging in or securing similar or other employment 
from any other corporation, company or individual, or shall in any 
manner conspire or contrive by correspondence or otherwise to 
prevent such discharged employee from securing employment, such 
person is guilty of a felon and shall be fined not less than $55 nor 
more than $1000 and imprisoned in the state prison not less than 
sixty days nor more than one year. 
